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Abstract

A vocal minority of the U.S. Supreme Court recently announced its suspicion that lower
courts and state and local administrative agencies are systematically ignoring constitutional rules
intended to limit, through heightened judicial review, exactions as a land use regulatory tool.
Exactions are the concessions local governments require of property owners as conditions for the
issuance of the entitlements that enable the intensified use of real property. In two cases decided
over the past two decades, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987) and Dolan v. City of
Tigard (1994), the Court has established under the Takings Clause a logic and metrics for
constitutionally permissible exactions that requires concessions to have an “essential nexus” and
be “roughly proportional” to the harms a proposed development is expected to cause. This
Article argues that the Court’s suspicions are well-founded, but that blame for judicial and
administrative non-compliance lies with the Court itself.
The Supreme Court’s efforts in Nollan and Dolan to establish doctrinal clarity in the
individualized, local land use regulatory process have not, and cannot, achieve their goals of
securely protecting property rights and discipline regulatory practices. What the Article
describes as the Court’s takings formalism fails to constrain regulatory practices in their intended
way, and results in constraints on the variable, locally situated, and intensely political context of
local governance. These constraints, which include incentives for local governments to develop
preconstituted regulatory formulas and disincentives against individualized, negotiated
concessions, often promote neither the Court’s preferred normative vision of strong property
rights protection nor the Court’s stated secondary concern for better, more efficient land use
regulation. Most perniciously, the Court’s limited doctrinal, normative, and utilitarian visions of
takings law may block and damage the essential political and social processes necessary to
legitimate and functional local governance.
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Introduction
In a recent dissent from a denial of a petition for certiorari, Justice Scalia announced his
suspicion that state and lower federal courts are systematically ignoring or misapplying the
Supreme Court’s takings decisions.1 His frustration emanated in part from what he saw as lower
courts’ willful or negligent confusion about the bifurcated structure of contemporary regulatory
takings law.2 The general default takings standard that applies to most takings claims (one
associated most closely with Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York) employs a
relatively low level of scrutiny and balances a number of factors in an ad hoc, open-ended
inquiry.3 Contrasting this default approach, takings claims that fall within a limited number of
exceptional, identifiable categories receive a form of heightened scrutiny, one which limits
judicial discretion and favors the protection of property rights through clear, narrow rules of
decision.4 Justice Scalia expressed two concerns regarding the tension between “categorical”
takings rules and the default approach to takings: first, that courts misapply or refuse to apply
the clear dictates of categorical takings rules and instead merely apply the less precise and more
deferential Penn Central standard; and second, that in doing so, lower courts dissipate
1

See Lambert v. City and County of San Francisco, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 562 (Cal.App. 1997), review granted, 71
Cal.Rptr.2d 215 (1998), appeal dismissed, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 (1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1549, 1551-52 (2000)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Joining Justice Scalia in his dissent were Justices Kennedy and Thomas. Some
commentators have made similar complaints. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Harms and Benefits of Nollan and
Dolan, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 477, 492 (1995) (“One of the reasons for Dolan was the hostile response to the lower
courts in Nollan.”); Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Non-Impact of the United States Supreme Court Regulatory Takings
Cases on the State Courts: Does the Supreme Court Really Matter?, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL L. J. 523, 555-56 (1995)
(tracking state and lower federal courts’ tendency to ignore or blunt the Supreme Court’s decisions in Nollan, Dolan,
and Lucas). The Takings Clause appears in the Fifth Amendment, and provides: “... nor shall private property be
taken for public use without just compensation.” Its application extends to state and federal government. See B. &
Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239, 241 (1897).
2
Lambert, 120 S.Ct. at 1551.
3
See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Following the lead of courts
and commentators, I will refer to this as the Penn Central test.
4
See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321-26 (2002);
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001). The most prominent of these categorical exceptions from Penn
Central’s balancing test is for regulatory acts denying all economically beneficial or productive use of land, which,
the Court held in a decision authored by Justice Scalia, are “compensable without case-specific inquiry.” Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Commission, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
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constitutional protections for property owners and thus dilute the conception of broad and stable
property rights Scalia and his dissenting colleagues thought the Court had firmly established.
The case that raised the justices’ suspicion, Lambert v. City and County of San Francisco,
involved a California intermediate appellate court’s refusal to apply the heightened scrutiny of
one of the categorical exceptions to the Penn Central approach,5 which the Court had developed
in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission6 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.7 Nollan and Dolan
concerned the judicial review of “exactions,” the concessions local governments require of
property owners as conditions for the issuance of entitlements that enable the intensified use of
real property.8 The majorities in those decisions declared two rule-like commands: any
exactions required as conditions for an approval to intensify the use of property must both
demonstrate an “essential nexus”9 and be in “rough proportionality”10 to the expected harms that
the new use would cause. Though somewhat inexact, these commands require that judicial
review perform a more probing inquiry into exactions than the state courts had in Nollan and
Dolan. This inquiry would identify and classify as takings what the Court believed were flawed
local land use regulatory practices that result in extortionate demands of besieged property
owners than conducted. Justice Scalia’s frustration with the state court’s decision in Lambert
(and presumably untold numbers of similar lower court decisions), then, relates first to what he
perceived as the failure of lower courts to apply Nollan and Dolan’s rule-like commands

5

The specific issue that concerned Justice Scalia in Lambert was whether the categorical exception to Penn Central
developed in Nollan and Dolan applied to exactions offered by a local government and rejected by a property owner,
where there is evidence that the owner’s rejection was a cause of the government’s ultimate denial of a necessary
entitlement for development. See Lambert, 120 S.Ct. at 1550. For a fuller discussion of the particularities of the
disputed issue in Lambert, see infra note 89.
6
483 U.S. 825 (1987).
7
512 U.S. 374 (1994).
8
See infra Part I.B.
9
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
10
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
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correctly and second to his perception that local governments have continued to use exactions to
expropriate or threaten to expropriate private property.
This Article concerns the Court’s efforts in Nollan and Dolan to constrain judicial and
local government discretion through a constitutional rule-formalism,11 and to impose this formal
discipline on the unruly, disparate practices of local land use regulation. It argues that the
Court’s efforts to establish doctrinal clarity—resulting in what Frank Michelman has called
“judicial devices for putting some kind of stop to the denaturalization and disintegration of
property”12— have not, and cannot, achieve their goals of securely protecting property rights and
disciplining regulatory practices. Moreover, the Article argues, the Court’s efforts have had
complicated, often unintended consequences insofar as they limit the political and social
dynamics essential to legitimate and effective local land use regulation. In short, the Court’s
constitutional rules for exactions fail to constrain regulatory practices in their intended way, and
result in largely unfortunate constraints on the variable, locally situated, and intensely political
context of local governance. In making this argument, the Article extends existing commentary
on Nollan and Dolan,13 and connects that literature to larger debates regarding rule-formalism
and vagueness in takings law generally.14

11

The term “formalism” has a variety of jurisprudential and historical meanings, invoking such diverse schools as
classical Langedellian conceptualism and constitutional textualism. My use of the term is quite specific, however.
By “rule-formalism” I mean a commitment imposing, in the relevant context of this Article, highly predictive ruleor principle-bound constitutional common law commands in order to limit judicial discretion. See generally
Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1983) (distinguishing between classical legal
conceptions of formalism and conceptualism). This approach correlates with, but is not necessarily tied to, other
meanings of the term formalism. See Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (1999); Frank
I. Michelman, A Brief Anatomy of Adjudicative Rule-Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 934 (1999). When I use the
term “formalism” throughout this Article, I mean rule-formalism.
12
Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1628 (1988); see also Margaret Jane Radin,
Diagnosing the Takings Problem, 33 NOMOS 248, 264-66 (1991) (describing desire within liberal ideal of the Rule
of Law for stable and understandable general rules).
13
The most prominent critiques of Nollan and Dolan’s logic and consequences are WILLIAM A. FISCHEL,
REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 341-51 (1995); Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on
Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473 (1989); David
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The first three Parts of this Article explain the relationship among exactions, takings
formalism, and regulatory formulas. Exactions, as Part I explains, are individualized means to
resolve contested issues about proposed development within the variable, locally situated content
of land use decisions. Part II characterizes the Court’s decisions in Nollan and Dolan as the
result of broader efforts by an occasional majority of the Court to establish far-reaching,
formalist rules that would provide stronger property protection and require administrative
precision of agencies that regulate land use. Nollan and Dolan have had some discernible effects
on land use regulatory practices, which Part III describes. Most significantly, the decisions have
contributed to local governments’ abandonment of individualized negotiations with property
owners over exactions, and have prompted them to favor instead legislative and often formulaic
approaches to calculating and imposing exactions.
In all, the Court’s efforts have had diverse effects on jurisdictions’ ability and willingness
to require property owners to agree to exactions that internalize the external costs of
development. Part IV argues that the Court’s constitutional rule-formalism and the resulting
formulaic administrative approach do not, in many instances, actually further the Court’s stated
goals of protecting individual property rights and forcing efficient regulation. In fact, they are
likely to result in the widespread underregulation and occasional overregulation of land use.
Equally important, Part V claims, the Court’s takings formalism has encouraged regulatory
formulas at the expense of individualized, alternative means for resolving contested disputes
over the expected costs of new development. These alternative means—including open,
contentious political battles and non-judicial methods of resolving them—are often quite messy.
A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1243 (1997); and Lee Ann
Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2000).
14
For a recent thorough review and reconsideration of that literature, see Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness
in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 93 (2002).
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But enabling and resolving political disputes are frequently essential ways to arrive at legitimate,
effective decisions within the disparate local contexts of land use regulation. The politics of land
use disputes, in sum, are constituent elements of legitimate, effective local governance, and
judicial efforts to remove politics from land use are doomed to disappoint their proponents.
The Article argues ultimately that while the Court’s concerns about individual property
rights and extortionate regulations are not entirely misplaced, they fail to consider the varied and
complicated situations of local governance and the competing visions of property within which
land use disputes emerge. 15 To the extent that a universal, formal clarity for land use law can
even be achieved—an assumption that this article implicitly disputes—such clarity can only be
imposed at great expense. In cases like Lambert, then, lower courts and state and local
legislatures may not be engaged in the ideological struggle that Justice Scalia seems to assume
causes their resistance to the Court’s commands. Rather, they may be struggling to find
acceptable resolutions to the complicated, locally situated, political land use conflicts that the
Court’s relatively blunt instruments fail to achieve.
I.

Land Use Bargaining and Exactions Practice.
A.

The Flexibility of Contemporary Land Use Regulation.

Since 1926, when the U.S. Supreme Court declared the practice constitutionally
permissible, a municipality has been able to utilize its police powers to utilize zoning regulations
within its jurisdiction in order to protect the public health, safety, and general welfare.16
Zoning’s early availability as a constitutionally permissible land use tool led to its widespread

15

In this sense, the Article is an effort to use as critique and offer as alternatives competing rhetorical modes of
understanding property from the limited approaches on which the Court relies. See Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of
Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 280 (1998).
16
See Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-90 (1926).
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adoption by local governments,17 and all fifty states now either require or enable their
municipalities to perform some level of comprehensive planning.18 Consistent with the
municipality’s comprehensive or general plan,19 the zoning ordinance and map define, with
variable specificity, the generally permissible land uses on specific parcels within the
jurisdiction.20 At its inception and during its early implementation, American zoning theory
proceeded from a series of presumptions that compromised what has been referred to as
“Euclidean” zoning.21 This approach strictly separates different types of land uses in discrete
zones, identifies uses within zones as early as possible in the development of a jurisdiction, and
keeps zoning designations stable over time, allowing only slight variances rarely and on a parcelby-parcel basis.22 Euclidean zoning’s formal, geographic conception of urban and suburban
development established, for long periods and with limited flexibility, the rules of land use
within a jurisdiction.
The static, inflexible Euclidean model began to break down after World War II, due in
particular to suburban development and to the vast social and economic changes wrought by
17

Developments in the Law—Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1434-35 (1978).
See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW, § 1.01 (5th ed. 2003); see generally Eric H. Steel, Participation and
Rules—The Functions of Zoning, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 709, 713 (speculating that zoning’s persistence as a
regulatory practice can be traced to the “widespread, if unarticulated, perception that the institution is serving some
vital social function”).
19
In contemporary land use and planning practice, a municipality’s zoning ordinance works as a second-level
regulation beneath the constitution-like comprehensive or master plan, which attempts to guide future land use
development within the jurisdiction. See MANDELKER, supra note 18, at § 3.01.
20
See “Zoning,” “Zoning Code,” and “Zoning Map,” in A GLOSSARY OF ZONING, DEVELOPMENT, AND PLANNING
TERMS 260-61 (Fay Dolnick & Michael Davidson eds., American Planning Association Planning Advisory Service
Report No. 491/492, 1999) [hereinafter A GLOSSARY OF ZONING].
21
See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 104 (2nd ed. 2000).
The term refers to the municipal defendant in the 1926 Supreme Court decision declaring zoning to be
constitutionally permissible. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
22
See Ira Michael Heyman, Legal Assaults on Municipal Land Use Regulation, 5 URB. L. 2 (1973), reprinted in THE
LAND USE AWAKENING: ZONING LAW IN THE SEVENTIES 51 (Robert H. Freilich & Eric O. Stuhler eds., 1981);
“Euclidean zoning,” in A GLOSSARY OF ZONING, supra note 20, at 94. Euclidean zoning’s appeal to early zoning
advocates and early adopting local governments was both economic and social: zoning promised to protect property
values by settling and enforcing expectations that land uses would be stable and segregated, and similarly secured
segregation of residential neighborhoods by class and race. See RICHARD E. FOGLESONG, PLANNING THE
CAPITALIST CITY: THE COLONIAL ERA TO THE 1920S 224-25 (1986).
18
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postwar growth.23 Especially in the past quarter-century, planning theory and land use law have
evolved into a relatively flexible regulatory model, one more reactive to changes in market
demand and regulatory need.24 Local governments adapt to changing patterns in commercial,
industrial, and residential uses by allowing piecemeal amendments as well as wholesale revisions
or redraftings of their comprehensive plan.25 Increasingly, municipalities have come to treat
their comprehensive plans, zoning ordinances and maps, subdivision ordinances, and issuance of
variances less as components of a permanent, fixed scheme and more as a fluid set of parameters
within which they establish contractual or conditional relationships with property owners seeking
to change the use of their property.26 It is within this context that local governments have
developed the practice of “exacting” concessions from property owners.
B.

Exactions Bargaining.

In order to make significant changes to the existing use of their land—changes like
subdividing parcels, initiating major construction projects, or shifting the type of use from
residential to commercial or to more intense residential or commercial uses—property owners
typically must seek one or more discretionary approvals from the jurisdiction’s zoning authority
or legislative body.27 Local governments reach their decision to approve or deny development

23

See MICHAEL J. MESHENBERG, THE ADMINISTRATION OF FLEXIBLE ZONING TECHNIQUES 3 (American Society of
Planning Officials Planning Advisory Service Report No. 318, 1976); Edward J. Kaiser & David R. Godschalk,
Twentieth Century Land Use Planning: A Stalwart Family Tree, 61 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 365, 372-73 (1995).
24
See MESHENBERG, supra note 23, at 3-4; Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as
Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837, 879-80 (1983).
25
See generally PETER W. SALSICH, JR. & TIMOTHY J. TRYNIECKI, LAND USE REGULATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS &
PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF LAND USE LAW 162-75 (1998) (describing numerous “innovative land use controls”
developed as responses to the rigidity of Euclidean zoning).
26
See IRVING SCHIFFMAN, ALTERNATIVE TECHNIQUES FOR MANAGING GROWTH 2-4 (1999).
27
See Daniel J. Curtin, Jr., How the West Was Won: Takings and Exactions—California Style, in TRENDS IN LAND
USE LAW FROM A TO Z, 193, 225-26 (Patricia E. Salkin ed., 2001). Such approvals take many forms, including the
permit to redevelop with the conditions that the City of Tigard granted and the variances from the conditions
imposed by the Community Development Code that Tigard denied in Dolan, as well as the coastal development
permit that the California Coastal Commission granted, with conditions, in Nollan. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 377-80;
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828-29.
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proposals after considering a specific project proposed for a particular piece of land.28 In this
process, local governments and property owners often negotiate over the concessions that an
applicant will agree to as the condition for issuance of the approval necessary to change the
existing land use on the subject parcel. State courts, which early on tended to condemn flexible,
negotiated land use regulatory practices as impermissible efforts by municipalities to contract
away their police powers, 29 have increasingly upheld such agreements, especially when states
have granted the municipalities authority to do so. 30
Exactions are a type of conditional zoning by which local governments, as a condition for
issuing a discretionary approval for development of land, require property owners and/or
developers to finance or provide public facilities.31 The typical exaction requires that in
exchange for the required regulatory approval by the local government for a proposed new land
use, the property owner provides or pays for some concession or package of concessions based
on the anticipated impacts of the proposed new land use and the actions (to be provided either by
the landowner or the local government) required to mitigate those impacts. Such concessions
may include dedication of land for the siting of public services or amenities (such as schools or
parks), fees in lieu of dedication, and impact fees to fund the provision of public services.32

28

ALAN A. ALTSHULER & JOSE A. GOMEZ-IBANEZ, REGULATION FOR REVENUE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
LAND USE EXACTIONS 54-55 (1993).
29
See PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 5.01 (1987); Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward
the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, Development Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of Government
Land Use Deals, 65 N.C. L. REV. 957, 1007 (1987).
30
See MANDELKER, supra note 18, at § 9.11; DANIEL P. SELMI & JAMES A. KUSHNER, LAND USE REGULATION 16265 (1999). Many states authorize the imposition of concessions in exchange for regulatory approvals. See, e.g.,
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 66000 (West 2003) (California’s Mitigation Fee Act, authorizing imposition of impact fees);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-28-133(4)(a) (2003) (authorizing dedications and in-lieu fees for park and school sites); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-42 (West 2003) (authorizing exactions for off-site improvements “necessitated or required”
by a subdivision seeking approval).
31
See SELMI & KUSHNER, supra note 30, at 161-63.
32
See New Jersey Builders Ass’n v. Mayor of Bernards Township, 528 A.2d. 555, 558-59 (1987); Been, supra note
13, at 475-76 (1989); Thomas W. Ledman, Local Governmental Environmental Mitigation Fees: Development
Exactions, The Next Generation, 45 FLA. L. REV. 835, 842-53 (1993). Another type of exaction is the “linkage,” an
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Exactions require financial or in- kind provision of needed or desired infrastructure; as such they
shape the physical environment, generate revenue, force the internalization of external costs
where private ordering is unlikely to do so, and resolve political conflict.33 Given the variety of
ends they promise to meet and their role in shaping the conditions for development, exactions are
fraught with political, legal, and emotional controversy not only for landowners, but also for
other affected parties (including neighbors, interest groups, and residents of the jurisdiction and,
possibly, region) and the regulatory agency itself.
Two parallel developments in municipal finance explain local governments’ increased
reliance on exactions to provide infrastructure. First, local governments face enormous fiscal
constraints from the combination of federal funding cuts, state and federal mandates regarding
the extent and quality of public infrastructure provision, and financial restraints on municipalities
resulting brought on by the anti-tax revolt of the late-1970s and 1980s.34 And at the same time,
local governments across the country suffer from an infrastructural deficit.35 By financing
infrastructural improvements, exactions help address this problem. Second, exactions respond to
the concern shared by regulators and the public that the external costs of new development
off-site development impact exactions intended to address effects linked to an approved development, such as the
increased need for affordable housing that might result from commercial and/or office development. See Theodore
C. Taub, Exactions, Linkages, and Regulatory Takings: The Developer’s Perspective, 20 URB. LAW. 515, 524
(1988).
33
ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 28, at 7; ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 286
(2000).
34
See Arthur C. Nelson, Development Impact Fees: The Next Generation, 26 URB. LAW. 541, 542-43 (1994);
reprinted in EXACTIONS, IMPACT FEES AND DEDICATIONS: SHAPING LAND-USE DEVELOPMENT AND FUNDING
INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE DOLAN ERA 87, (Robert H. Freilich & David W. Bushek eds., 1995); ALTSHULER &
GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 28, at 23-26; Paul P. Downing & Thomas S. McCaleb, The Economics of Development
Exactions, in DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS 43, 44 (James E. Frank & Robert M. Rhodes eds., 1987); Louis F.
Wechsler et al., Politics and Administration of Development Exactions, in DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS, supra, at 15,
34-36.
35
See Deborah Rhoads, Developer Exactions and Public Decision Making in the United States and England, 11
ARIZ.. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 469, 472 (1994); R. Marlin Smith, From Subdivision Improvement Requirements to
Community Benefit Assessments and Linkage Payments: A Brief History of Land Development Exactions, 50 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 5-6 (Winter 1987); Fred P. Bosselman & Nancy Stroud, Legal Aspects of Development
Exactions, in DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS, supra note 34, at 70, 73.
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should not be passed on to surrounding landowners, the existing infrastructure, state and local
government treasuries, and the environment. By ordinance or by individualized, ad hoc decision,
a jurisdiction may require that a property owner and/or developer who seeks discretionary
approval for an entitlement to intensify land use make monetary or non-financial concessions
that will at minimum remedy the proposed project’s anticipated negative impacts.36
C.

Exactions as a Flexible Tool for Land Use Bargaining.

Although alternatives to exactions exist, they are unlikely either to be as financially
effective or as politically palatable as imposing exactions.37 Accordingly, local governments
faced with a controversial and potentially costly approval may simply deny the applications, seek
assistance from similarly cast-strapped state and federal governments, raise general revenues
through property taxation, or allow their infrastructure to deteriorate.38 Because of the practical
or political improbability of all these options except denial, a local government’s choice is most
often between denial or approval with exactions. When a property owner seeks additional rights
to engage in a more intensive and valuable use of her land, exactions enable the property owner
and local government to trade critical entitlements and achieve a mutually advantageous end by
avoiding the denial option.39 In this sense, exactions can enable growth both by funding
necessary infrastructure and by fending off anti-growth sentiment; at the same time, they can

36

See ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 28, at 62-63, 77, 95-96. On the extent to which exactions
requiring property owners to perform duties and pay fees to cover the anticipated impacts of rezoning, see James C.
Nicholas, Impact Exactions: Economic Theory, Practice, and Incidence, 50 LAW & COMTEMP. PROBS. 85, 88
(Winter 1987).
37
Such other, generally less attractive means include ad valorem property taxes, see Downing & McCaleb, supra
note 34, at 49-50; special assessments, see ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 28, at 17; required subdivision
improvements, see Smith, supra note 29, at 6; user fees, see JAMES C. NICHOLAS ET AL., A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE
TO DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES at xix (1991); and the common law of nuisance, see Erin Ryan, Zoning, Taking, and
Dealing: The Problems and Promise of Bargaining in Land Use Planning Conflicts, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 337,
341 (2002).
38
ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 28, at 2-3.
39
See Fennell, supra note 13, at 21-26.
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also limit growth by requiring expensive, and perhaps prohibitive, concessions from
developers.40
Consider a few admittedly simplistic hypotheticals. In the first, a local government
chooses between (1) the legally permissible denial of an application for an entitlement to develop
land, and (2) an approval of that entitlement conditioned upon the property owner’s mitigation of
the project’s impacts that it thinks will not internalize fully the costs of the development. Here,
the rational local government will deny the entitlement. By contrast, consider a second
hypothetical local government faced with an option (2) that would enable it to require or accept
an offset that at least internalizes all costs and may even benefit its constituents or its treasury.
Bargains like this may provide the property owner with a significantly better result than an
outright denial, but may also provide benefits to—and will at least not push costs onto— the
jurisdiction and its residents.41
Considered this way, exactions may appear allocatively efficient by forcing property
owners to bear the costs of the impacts of the development of their land.42 However, they can
also be inequitable as well as expensive and uncertain to administer. For example, they can
constitute a regressive form of redistribution that discriminates against newcomers and renters by
raising the cost of new housing.43 In addition, they rely upon estimates of the costs and harms of
development, which can be difficult to ascertain, evaluate, and remediate and which can
therefore lead to imprecise and potentially inaccurate and inefficient assumptions about the terms

40

Elizabeth A. Deakin, The Politics of Exactions, in PRIVATE SUPPLY OF PUBLIC SERVICES: EVALUATION OF REAL
ESTATE EXACTIONS, LINKAGE, AND ALTERNATIVE LAND POLICIES 96, 98-103 (Rachelle Alterman ed., 1988).
41
COOTER, supra note 33, at 299-302.
42
See THOMAS J. MICELI & KATHLEEN SEGERSON, COMPENSATION FOR REGULATORY TAKINGS: AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS WITH APPLICATIONS 55-59 (1996). Conditions on development that generate greater social benefits than
total social costs efficiently allocate costs and benefits. See Dana, supra note 13, at 1247.
43
ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 28, at 134-36.
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of the resulting bargain.44 Their flexibility can lead to wide disparities in the types and extent of
exactions required of property owners in the same jurisdiction, sometimes because of favoritism
for or discrimination against particular property owners or sometimes because of regulatory
changes over time. Exactions can also vary widely in and across jurisdictions due to political,
market, environmental, and competitive differences among cities and counties (and at times in
the same jurisdiction). In communities seeking to protect or enhance especially attractive but
fragile resources (beaches and mountains or proximity thereto, for example), the concessions
required from property owners seeking discretionary approvals are likely to be greater; and the
same is likely the case in jurisdictions that are at or near build-out and are suffering from
infrastructure deficits that they wish at least to hold steady, if not reverse, and where local
majorities are able to wield political power to exclude newcomers through exclusionary zoning.45
By contrast, concessions are likely to be smaller in jurisdictions that for political or financial
reasons wish to attract development, and that are willing to ignore or knowingly bear the costs of
that development’s impact.46
In sum, exactions vary, and their great strength as a tool for governance—providing
flexibility to solve otherwise intractable regulatory blockages that would result in denials—is
also their greatest liability, rendering them neither a precise nor predictable regulatory tool.47
Nevertheless, when used effectively and based upon relatively complete information about a

44

See infra Part IV.A.
See Ann E. Carlson & Daniel Pollak, Takings on the Ground: How the Supreme Court’s Takings Jurisprudence
Affects Local Land Use Decisions, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103, 128-30 (2001); Stewart E. Sterk, Competition
Among Municipalities as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions, 45 VAND. L. REV. 831, 834-35 (1992).
46
See Carlson & Pollak, supra note 45, at 128-30; Sterk, supra note 45, at 859.
47
Empirical studies demonstrate the variability of effects that impact fees have on land values and new and existing
housing prices. See MARLA DRESH & STEVEN M. SHEFFRIN, WHO PAYS FOR DEVELOPMENT FEES AND EXACTIONS?
25-26 (1997); Keith R. Ihlanfeldt & Timothy M. Shaughnessy, An Empirical Investigation of the Effects of Impact
Fees on Housing and Land Markets, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Working Papers # CP02A13, at 15-16 (July
2002) (visited July 21, 2003) <http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/pub-detail.asp?id=563>.
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proposed land use and its likely impacts, exactions appear to be the best available regulatory tool
within the modern, flexible land use regulatory framework for forcing the internalization of
external costs. “Best” in this context does not necessarily mean effective or even especially
good,48 but rather best available.49 But exactions at least evoke and theoretically enable a
roughly equitable, roughly efficient solution to the recurring problem of the future harms and
external costs attributable to the increased intensity of land use. Moreover, to the extent that
parties affected by the new land use have some say in the process by which concessions are
identified and calculated, exactions at least create the conditions for a regulatory process by
which the issuance of approvals for new development can be inclusive, negotiated, and
politically productive and legitimate.
II.

Nollan and Dolan and The Federal Constitutionalization of Land Use Bargaining.
Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s entrance into the field in Nollan and Dolan,50 state

courts had applied various state statutory and constitutional doctrines to develop differing
standards of review for land use exactions.51 These standards varied considerably.52 When it
articulated its pair of federal constitutional standards to evaluate the permissibility of exactions
48

See Vicki Been, Smart Growth Requires Efficient Growth, 34 CONN. L. REV. 611, 613 (2002) (decrying the
tendency of local governments that enable sprawl development to require insufficient exactions).
49
The list of theoretically better regulatory practices includes local property taxation, aid passed to local
governments from federal and state government tax revenues, and user charges for services. See ALTSHULER &
GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 28, at 2-3, 132-38. Although more progressive and/ or more efficient, these alternatives
are less popular politically than exactions and require statutory authority or beneficence from rival levels of
government. See id.
50
Before Nollan, the Court had avoided property owners’ challenges to exactions under the federal Constitution on a
number of occasions. See Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal.3d 633 (1971), appeal
dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971); Home Builders & Contractors Ass'n v. Board of County Comm'rs, 446 So.2d 140
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 976 (1984); Jordan v. Vill. of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d
442 (Wis. 1966), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966) (dismissed due to lack of substantial federal question).
51
See generally John J. Delaney et al., The Needs-Nexus Analysis: A Unified Test for Validating Subdivision
Exactions, User Impact Fees and Linkage, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 146-56 (Winter 1987) (summarizing
differing state approaches pre-Nollan); see, e.g., Joseph D. Lee, Note, Sudden Impact: The Effect of Dolan v. City of
Tigard on Impact Fees in Washington, 71 WASH. L. REV. 205, 212-13 (1996) (summarizing judicial review of
impact fees in Washington in which courts used statutory, takings, and substantive due process approaches).
52
See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389-91.
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under the Takings Clause, the Supreme Court established a uniform floor of property rights on
what had previously been a diverse, experimental patchwork of state law.53 Before discussing
the Nollan and Dolan decisions and their applicability to different types of exactions (the
subjects of the second and third sections of this Part), the next section briefly describes the
earlier state approaches.
A.

Judicial Review and Statutory Limits to Exactions Prior to Nollan and
Dolan.

State courts considering exactions before Nollan generally took one of three
approaches.54 Some states, including Illinois and New Hampshire, adopted a strict “specific and
uniquely attributable” test, which required an exaction to connect directly and be precisely
proportional to the harm created by the new land use.55 In the Illinois case establishing the test,
for example, the state supreme court struck down an exaction requiring plaintiffs to provide
recreational and educational facilities because the municipality’s need for such facilities arose
from the “total development of the community” rather than directly from the marginal increase in
infrastructure costs that the plaintiff’s proposal would cause.56 Without an extremely close
relationship to the harms generated, the court reasoned, an exaction would be confiscatory rather
than a “reasonable regulation under the police power.”57

53

See James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, The Impact of a Federal Takings Norm on Fashioning a Means-End
Fit Under Takings Provisions of State Constitutions, 8 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 143 (1999).
54
See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389-91; Michael H. Crew, Development Agreements After Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm’n, 22 URB. LAW. 23, 26-27 (1990); Michael M. Berger, Happy Birthday, Constitution: The Supreme Court
Establishes New Ground Rules for Land-Use Planning, 20 URB. LAW. 735, 750 & nn.80-82 (1988).
55
See Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Vill. of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Ill. 1961) (specific and
uniquely attributable test); J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v. Town of Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 15 (N.H. 1981) (same); see
also Haugen v. Gleason, 226 Or. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (Or. 1961) (holding that a fee imposed in lieu of land dedication
would be unconstitutional unless the money collected was earmarked to benefit the proposed subdivision); Frank
Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 264 A.2d 910, 913-14 (R.I. 1970) (adopting Pioneer Trust to review park and land
dedications). The states that have adopted the specific and uniquely attributable test tend to be those with relatively
slow patterns of growth in the midwest and northeast. See Nicholas, supra note 36, at 95.
56
Pioneer Trust, 176 N.E.2d at 802.
57
Id.
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Other states, most notably California, explicitly rejected the “specific and uniquely
attributable” test in favor of a more deferential test requiring only that the municipality produce
general proof and conclusions as to the connection between the exaction and proposed
development.58 The more deferential approaches generally appeared in two forms: in reasonable
relationship tests, courts upheld exactions that had some reasonable degree of connection to the
proposed development,59 or, most commonly,60 in somewhat more rigorous dual rational nexus
tests. 61 These dual nexus tests considered the relationships between the exaction and the needs
the proposed development would create, as well as that between the exaction and the benefits the
development would enjoy.62 Despite the relative deference of these approaches, neither assured
municipalities victory.63

58

See Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal.3d at 638, 640-41 & n.7 (adopting reasonable
relationship test and rejecting Pioneer Trust); Jordan, 137 N.W.2d at 447 (same).
59
See, e.g., Billings Props., Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182, 188-89 (Mont. 1964) (adopting reasonable
relationship test and declaring that a legislatively determined exaction should be upheld unless the property owner
demonstrates that the exaction is unreasonable); Jenad, Inc. v. Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673 (N.Y. 1966) (adopting
reasonable relationship test); see generally William A. Falik & Anna C. Shimko, The “Takings” Nexus—The
Supreme Court Chooses a New Direction in Land-Use Planning: A View from California, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 359,
381-88 (1988) (recounting California’s pre-Nollan exactions cases).
60
See Thomas M. Pavelko, Note, Subdivision Exactions: A Review of Judicial Standards, 25 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 269, 287 (1983).
61
See generally Note, Municipal Development Exactions, the Rational Nexus Test, and the Federal Constitution,
102 HARV. L. REV. 992, 993-96 (1989) (describing the rational nexus test developed in state courts before Nollan).
These two relatively deferential approaches are difficult to distinguish in practice. The Utah Supreme Court, for
example, has declared its approach to be based on a “reasonableness” test, but has in practice considered both the
extent to which the need for an exaction is reasonably attributable to the proposed development and the extent to
which the benefits are demonstrable, if not solely directed to, the development’s future residents. See Banberry Dev.
Corp. v. South Jordan, 631 P.2d 899, 903-05 (Utah 1981).
62
See Pavelko, supra note 60, at 993-96.
63
See, e.g., Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n of Town of Danbury, 230 A.2d 45, 46-47 (Conn.
Super. 1967) (after upholding ordinance requiring dedication of park land based on maximum and minimum that did
not impose “specifically and uniquely attributable” test, court invalidated as unconstitutional a fee imposed in lieu of
dedication because the local ordinance did not require that the fee benefit the proposed subdivision); Howard
County v. JJM, Inc., 482 A.2d 908 (Md. 1984) (declaring unconstitutional an exaction imposed under county
ordinance requiring a developer to indefinitely reserve land for a state road because exaction bore no reasonable
nexus to the proposed development and deprived the developer of any use of his land).
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State legislatures played an important role in limiting exactions before Nollan and
Dolan,64 and continue to do so today.65 By providing municipalities explicit authority to impose
exactions, state statutes have limited exactions that require the dedication of land66 and impose
impact fees.67 Prior to Nollan, state courts often invalidated exactions that lacked or exceeded
statutory authority.68
B.

Nollan and Dolan.

Nollan and Dolan established two tests that the Supreme Court described as reflecting the
mainstream of state court precedent for the relationship between a development proposal’s harms
and an exaction’s conditions.69 These tests evaluate the degree of relationship between the
exaction to the proposed development’s anticipated harms by imposing a heightened judicial
scrutiny on exactions, one based on a rule-like command lower courts must apply. In Nollan, the
plaintiffs sought to demolish and replace a small, worn-down bungalow on their beachfront
property and replace it with a three-bedroom house similar to those of their neighbors.70 The
California Coastal Commission, from whom the Nollans needed a discretionary permit to build
their new beach house,71 made issuance of the permit conditional on the Nollans' dedication of a
public easement across the portion of their beachfront property that lay between the high tide line

64

See Bosselman & Stroud, supra note 35, at 76.
See MANDELKER, supra note 18, at §§ 9.11, 9.18, 9.21.
66
See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65909(a) (West 2003) (prohibiting permit approval and zoning variance conditions
requiring land dedications that are not “reasonably related” to the proposed use of the property).
67
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-1-801 et seq. (2003); (authorizing imposition of “land development charges”)
HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-142 (2002) (authorizing counties to collect impact fees); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. Title
12, § 395.001 et seq. (2003) (authorizing collection of impact fees).
68
See, e.g., City of Montgomery v. Crossroads Land Co., 355 So.2d 363 (Ala. 1978) (invalidating as beyond
statutory authority fees imposed in lieu of park land dedication); Haugen, 359 P.2d at 111 (invalidating fee imposed
on residential developers in lieu of park land dedication because failure of ordinance to limit use of funds to benefit
made the fee a tax, which the county had no statutory authority to impose); see generally Delaney et al., supra note
51, at 146 & n.49 (citing cases in which courts invalidated exactions for lack of statutory authority).
69
See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 839-40; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
70
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828.
71
See id. (citing CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30106, 30212, 30600 (West 1986)).
65
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and the seawall that separated the beachfront from the rest of their property.72 The Commission
justified this condition on the grounds that the Nollans’ larger house would obstruct the public’s
visual access to the beach, increase private use of the shorefront, and burden the public's ability
to traverse to and along the shorefront. In all, the Commission concluded, these impacts would
have adverse psychological effects on the public.73
The Supreme Court held that the Commission’s imposition of this condition violated the
Takings Clause on the grounds that the easement—which if required outside the context of a
permit application would have effected a taking for which compensation would unquestionably
have been due74—lacked an “essential nexus” to the harm created by the proposed building.75
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia suggested that the Commission could have met the test
for an essential nexus by requiring a more closely linked exaction—such as a “viewing spot,” a
public viewing platform that would allow visual access to the beach over the top of the
development—but that a lateral beach easement lacked such a nexus because it had little relation
to the harm the Commission sought to address.76 Under its own regulations and without liability
for a taking, the Commission could have denied the Nollans’ permit application; nevertheless,
conditioning the permit’s approval on the Nollans’ granting of an unrelated easement to the
public constituted, in Justice Scalia’s words, “an out-and-out plan of extortion” which as such
required compensation.77
Nollan thus settled two issues: whether exactions as a general matter are constitutionally
permissible (they are) and what a specific exaction could require (a concession bearing an
72

Id. at 828-29.
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 829 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
74
Id. at 831.
75
Id. at 837.
76
Id. at 836.
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Id. at 837 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
73
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essential nexus, or substantive relationship, to the proposed land use’s harms). It left open,
however, the issue of how much of a concession a government entity could permissibly require.
That is, Nollan had settled the qualitative limits of exactions; seven years later, Dolan settled the
quantitative issue. In Dolan, the Court considered a property owner’s challenge to two
conditions the city of Tigard, Oregon, placed on its approval of the property owner’s application
to expand her hardware store. The city required that she dedicate a portion of her land as a
public greenway in order to mitigate flooding from a nearby creek, and that she dedicate a strip
of land adjacent to the floodplain for a segment of a continuous bike path throughout the city in
order to mitigate the increased traffic congestion that would result from the increased size of the
hardware store.78 These conditions, unlike the beach easement in Nollan, bore an "essential
nexus" to the harms expanding store would create, namely increases in impervious surfaces and
in traffic created by shoppers driving to the store’s downtown location.79 Establishing a test it
claimed to divine from the variety of prior state supreme court exactions cases,80 the Court held
that the city had failed to show that the required concessions were in “‘rough proportionality’ . . .
both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.”81 The Court placed the
burden of proof on the government entity to establish, with some rough degree of precision and
with more than simply “conclusory statement[s],” that its proposed exactions on land
development would remediate the effects of the proposed development.82

78

Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379-80 & n.2.
Id. at 386-88.
80
Id. at 390-91; but see Julian R. Kossow, Dolan v. City of Tigard, Takings Law, and the Supreme Court: Throwing
the Baby Out with the Floodwater, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 215, 231-32 & n.86 (1995) (arguing that the “rough
proportionality” test had no support in state court precedent, and was in fact newly minted by the Court in Dolan).
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Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
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Id. at 395-96. Whether the burden is on the government to prove an essential nexus is unclear, however, because
Nollan did not directly address the issue. See Sam D. Starritt & John H. McClanahan, Land-Use Planning and
Takings: The Viability of Conditional Exactions to Conserve Open Space in the Rocky Mountain West After Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 114 S.Ct. 2309 (1994), 30 LAND & WATER L. REV. 415, 445 (1995).
79

18

In the final paragraph of his majority decision, Justice Rehnquist praised the city of
Tigard for having undertaken the “commendable task of land use planning, made necessary by
increasing urbanization,” as well as for seeking to further the “laudable” goals of “reducing
flooding hazards and traffic congestion, and providing for public greenways.”83 But, the Court
cautioned, there are “outer limits” to the methods of achieving worthy land use planning goals.84
Those goals could not be reached “‘by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the
change.’”85 Implicit in these remarks, and in the Court’s conclusion that in undertaking this task
and furthering these goals the city had exceeded its constitutional authority, is the Court’s
approval of the constitutionally permissible ends of land use exactions, and its articulation of
exactions’ constitutional limits as quantitative and qualitative.
To summarize the Court’s particularized approach to exactions: Nollan established the
constitutionally required logic of exactions, a logic that limits concessions to those that address
and seek to internalize the harms and costs of the proposed project. That logic’s constitutional
minimum is an “essential nexus.” Dolan established the constitutionally required metric of
exactions, extending Nollan’s logic to a quantitative measure—rough proportionality—of the
extent of the project’s expected harms.
C. The Confused Scope of Nollan and Dolan’s Heightened Scrutiny.
As the Court clarified unanimously in its 1999 decision in Del Monte Dunes, Nollan and
Dolan’s heightened scrutiny applies only in the “special context of exactions”; it cannot be
applied to decisions to deny applications for discretionary approvals.86 As such, exactions are a
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Dolan, 512 U.S. at 396.
Id.
85
Id. (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922)).
86
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 119 S.Ct. 1624, 1635 (1999) (declaring that Dolan was
“not designed to address, and . . . not readily applicable to, the much different questions arising where, as here, the
84
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category of land use regulations excepted from the default Penn Central approach to takings
claims. Notwithstanding the relative precision of the tests Nollan and Dolan declare, the
applicability of this heightened scrutiny within the wide variety of exactions is not entirely
certain.87 Nollan and Dolan’s reach is significant for the various entities interested in exactions,
because when the federal constitution’s heightened scrutiny does not apply, courts review
challenged exactions under their own, often more deferential, tests in which property owners
may be less likely to win.88 I consider below the two central issues that remain unclear regarding
the reach of Nollan and Dolan.89
1.

The Possessory/ Non-Possessory Exaction Distinction.

Neither Nollan nor Dolan resolved whether the essential nexus and rough proportionality
tests apply only to exactions that require the dedication of land for public use (as in the facts of

landowner's challenge is based not on excessive exactions but on denial of development”); id. at 1650 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting the use of the Dolan standard "for reviewing land-use regulations generally”). Although not a
clear distinction—as Richard Epstein has argued, any land use regulation can be described as an exaction to the
extent that it forbids or limits a particular land use while enabling other uses—the Court in Del Monte Dunes
explicitly declared the difference between stated and implied conditions to be constitutionally significant. See
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 20 (1993).
87
See generally Edward H. Ziegler, Development Exactions and Permit Decisions: The Supreme Court’s Nollan,
Dolan, and Del Monte Dunes Decisions, 34 URB. LAW. 155, 161-64 (2002) (describing issues resolved and left open
by Del Monte Dunes); David L. Callies, Regulatory Takings and the Supreme Court: How Perspectives on Property
Rights Have Changed from Penn Central to Dolan, and What State and Federal Courts Are Doing About It, 28
STETSON L. REV. 523, 567-74 (1999) (describing open issues prior to Del Monte Dunes).
88
See, e.g., San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 105 (Cal. 2002) (where Nollan and
Dolan do not apply, reviewing exaction for its “reasonable relationship, in both intended use and amount, to the
deleterious public impact of the development”).
89
I do not consider below an additional issue whose complexity renders it beyond the scope of this Article. It is
unclear whether the mere offer of an unconstitutional exaction made during the application review process may be
subject to heightened scrutiny under the federal Takings Clause, even if the property owner rejects or the
government withdraws the offered exaction. See generally Andrew W. Schwartz, The Application of Nollan/Dolan
Heightened Scrutiny to Legislative Regulations and “Unsuccessful Exactions,” presented to October 1999 Litigating
Regulatory Takings Claims Conference, Georgetown University Law Center, available at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/conference/schwartz.htm (discussing Goss v. City of Little Rock, 90 F.3d
306, 309-10 (8th Cir. 1996); Lambert, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d at 568-69). In Goss, the Eighth Circuit held that Dolan could
apply to the city’s denial of an application to rezone property after its owner refused the city’s condition that he deed
a portion of his land to the city to widen an adjacent road In Lambert, by contrast, an intermediate appellate court in
California held that a city’s denial of a conditional permit should not be reviewed under the heightened scrutiny of
Nollan and Dolan despite evidence in the record showing the city would have issued the permit if owners had agreed
to pay an impact fee.
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Nollan and Dolan themselves), or whether they extend to exactions such as impact fees or other
concessions that do not require the dedication of land.90 The Court in Del Monte Dunes noted
that none of its decisions had extended Dolan beyond exactions requiring dedication of
property91 and some state and lower federal courts have relied on that distinction when they have
refused to extend heightened scrutiny to non-possessory exactions.92 At the same time, a
significant number of courts have applied heightened scrutiny to non-dedicatory exactions
applied in individualized proceedings.93
90

See generally Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (distinguishing Dolan, in which the challenged exaction required the
property owner to dedicate part of her land to the city, from other regulatory takings cases applying different
standards of review, in which the challenged regulations imposed conditions that were “simply a limitation on the
use” the property owners made of their land). This distinction between dedicatory and non-dedicatory exactions is
consistent with the Court’s repeated statements, both in Nollan and in other takings cases, that required dedications
demand more careful judicial review because of the “heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the
compensation requirement, rather than the stated police-power objective.” Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841; see also Lucas,
505 U.S. at 1015 (distinguishing permanent physical invasions, “no matter how minute the intrusion,” from other
land use regulations, unless the latter deny “all economically beneficial or productive use of land”). On the
confusion in state and lower federal courts prior to Del Monte Dunes over whether Nollan and Dolan apply to
exactions requiring other than the dedication of land, see Nancy E. Stroud, A Review of Del Monte Dunes v. City of
Monterey and Its Implications for Local Government Exactions, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 195, 203-05 (1999).
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P.2d 429, 437 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999), aff’d on different grounds, 49 P.3d 860 (Wash. 2002) (concluding that
statements in Del Monte Dunes limiting Dolan to exactions requiring dedications of land were dicta); Bruce W.
Bringardner, Exactions, Impact Fees, and Dedications: National and Texas Law After Dolan and Del Monte Dunes,
32 URB. LAW. 561, 582 (2000) (asserting that Del Monte Dunes statement was dicta, and further arguing that
distinction between dedicatory and non-dedicatory exactions is meaningless).
92
See, e.g., Garneau v. City of Seattle, 147 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1998) (Nollan and Dola
n do not apply to ordinance
requiring landlords to provide cash relocation assistance to tenants displaced as a result of redevelopment); Clajon
Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1578 (10th Cir. 1995) ("Nollan and Dolan are best understood as extending the
analysis of complete physical occupation cases to those situations in which the government achieves the same end
(i.e., the possession of one's physical property) through a conditional permitting procedure."); McCarthy v. City of
Leawood, 894 P.2d 836, 845 (Kan. 1995) (Nollan and Dolan do not apply to traffic impact fee ordinance); Henry v.
Jefferson County Planning Comm'n, 148 F.Supp.2d 698, 709 n. 142 (N.D.W.Va. 2001) (refusing to apply Dolan to
use permit conditions that required public improvements to property, in part because conditions did not involve
dedication of land for public use). One recent state supreme court case made an even finer distinction: Dolan
applies to required dedications of land in which the land is made open to the public generally, but not to required
dedications that would be open only to the future residents of the subdivision for which the exaction was to be
required. See City of Annapolis v. Waterman, 745 A.2d 1000 (Md. 2000).
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See, e.g., Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 433 (Cal. 1996) (plurality opinion) (concluding that Nollan
and Dolan "apply, under the circumstances of this case, to the monetary exaction imposed by Culver City as a
condition of approving plaintiff's [rezoning] request"); Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 71
S.W.3d 18, 34 (2002), rehearing overruled (applying Nollan and Dolan to exaction requiring improvements to
public street); Benchmark Land Co. v. City of Battle Ground, 972 P.2d 944, 950 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (holding
that Nollan and Dolan apply "where the City requires the developer as a condition of approval to incur substantial
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Courts have reason to assume the applicability of Nollan and Dolan to impact fees. Prior
to its decision in Del Monte Dunes, the Court had remanded to the California Supreme Court the
California Court of Appeal decision in Ehrlich v. Culver City, which applied a relatively low
standard of review to impact fee exactions. The Court directed the California court to review the
decision in light of the recently issued decision in Dolan.94 Although it has yet to face the issue
directly, the Court’s remand of Ehrlich and lower federal and state court decisions (including the
California Supreme Court’s decision in Ehrlich) may have settled the issue in favor of extending
Nollan and Dolan to non-possessory exactions like impact fees.95
2.

The Adjudicative/ Legislative Distinction.

Also unresolved is whether the essential nexus and rough proportionality tests apply only
to exactions imposed by adjudicative decisions regulating individual piece of land, or if they
extend also to legislative decisions regulating an entire jurisdiction or larger units thereof.96 This

costs improving an adjoining street”), aff’d on different grounds, 49 P.3d 860 (Wash. 2002).
94
512 U.S. 1231, 1145 S.Ct. 2731 (1994).
95
See generally Stroud, supra note 90, at 202-06 (discussing the split among courts on this point and possible
implications of Del Monte Dunes). Commentators arguing against the possessory/ non-possessory distinction
include J. David Breemer, The Evolution of the “Essential Nexus”: How State and Federal Courts Have Applied
Nollan and Dolan and Where They Should Go From Here, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 373, 397-401 (2002); Callies,
supra note 87, at 568-72; Douglas W. Kmiec, Inserting the Last Remaining Pieces Into the Takings Puzzle, 38 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 995, 1036-37 (1997); Mark W. Cordes, Legal Limits on Development Exactions: Responding to
Nollan and Dolan, 15 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 513, 540-43 (1995). Some commentators propose a test for challenges to
impact fees based on substantive due process rather than the Takings Clause. See Julian C. Juergensmeyer & James
C. Nicholas, Impact Fees Should Not Be Subjected to Takings Analysis, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES: THE
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PERSPECTIVES 357, 359-63 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002) (citing Hollywood Inc. v. Broward
County, 431 S. 2d 606, 609-10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)) (arguing for due process-based dual rational nexus test
that would consider whether there was a reasonable connection between, first, locality’s need for additional capital
facilities and the new development, and second, the funds collected and the benefits accruing to the new
development).
96
See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (distinguishing between challenges to "essentially legislative determinations
classifying entire areas of the city,” and the challenges reviewed in Dolan (and, by implication, Nollan), which were
to “adjudicative decision to condition petitioner’s application for a building permit on an individual parcel”); see
also id. at 391 n.8 (noting that judicial review of “an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's application for a
building permit on an individual parcel” applies heightened scrutiny and places the burden rests on the government
entity to prove that an exaction did not effect a taking, as opposed to judicial review of “generally applicable zoning
regulations,” which proceeds under a more relaxed scrutiny with the burden on the property owner to demonstrate
that the exaction constitutes a taking). More recently, the Court denied certiorari in a case in which the Georgia
Supreme Court refused to apply heightened scrutiny to its review of land use regulations imposed by a zoning
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distinction, which is harder to discern in the smaller, less formal governmental structures of
municipalities than in federal and state governments,97 assumes that the Takings Clause is most
likely to be implicated when an individual is singled out through an adjudicative-type act by a
government agency. When the regulation affects large segments of the public, the Takings
Clause is less commonly implicated.98 In addition, because a legislatively enacted exaction
provides regulatory certainty to property owners, it is less likely to be an unanticipated
frustration of property owners’ investment-backed expectations.99 Lower federal and state courts

ordinance. A dissent written by Justice Thomas, and joined only by Justice O’Connor, attacked the legislative/
adjudicative distinction as unclear, illogical, and essentially meaningless. See Parking Ass'n of Georgia v. City of
Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200 (Ga. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1116 (1995) (Thomas & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
97
See Inna Reznik, Note, The Distinction Between Legislative and Adjudicative Decisions in Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 242, 260-61 (2000); Laurie Reynolds, Local Subdivision Regulation: Formulaic
Constraints in an Age of Discretion, 24 GA. L. REV. 525, 544-49 (1990). In the smaller setting of local government,
where political minorities or individuals can sometimes more easily overcome political majorities through greater
access to representatives and where effected parties may have more constitutional protections of due process rights,
adjudicative processes can often be more protective of individuals’ property rights than legislative ones. See
Reznik, supra, at 272-73. Indeed, the exactions reviewed in both Nollan and Dolan could be understood as broadly
applicable rather than as individualized adjudications, as the majorities in both cases seem to treat them. See Dolan,
512 U.S. at 414 n.* (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (“The majority characterizes this case as involving an
‘adjudicative decision’ to impose permit conditions, but the permit conditions were imposed pursuant to Tigard's
Community Development Code. The adjudication here was of Dolan's requested variance from the permit
conditions otherwise required to be imposed by the Code."); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 829 (noting that the Coastal
Commission had placed similar conditions on "43 out of 60 coastal development permits along the same tract of
land. . . . [O]f the 17 not so conditioned, 14 had been approved when the Commission did not have administrative
regulations in place allowing imposition of the condition, and the remaining 3 had not involved shorefront
property."). State courts seem quite capable of making fine distinctions, however. Compare Dudek v. Umatilla
County, 69 P.3d 751 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (applying Dolan to legislatively adopted exaction scheme where ordinance
grants discretion to county to determine extent of exaction); with Rogers Machinery, Inc. v. Washington County, 45
P.3d 966 (Or. Ct. App. 2002), rev. denied, 52 P.3d 1057 (Or. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 1482 (2003) (refusing to
apply heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan to a legislatively determined “system development charge” of traffic
impact fees levied by local government under authority of state statute).
98
See Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 1333, 1348 (1991). Accordingly, as Lee
Ann Fennell has noted, the distinction between legislative and adjudicative decisions continues to retain both logical
coherence and conceptual importance given the distinction the Court stressed in Del Monte Dunes between
exactions and development denial. See Fennell, supra note 13, at 10-11.
99
See Dana, supra note 13, at 1261 n.92; Douglas R. Porter, Will Developers Pay to Play, in DEVELOPMENT
IMPACT FEES: POLICY RATIONALE, PRACTICE, THEORY, AND ISSUES 73, 76 (Arthur C. Nelson ed., 1988); see also
George Wyeth, Regulatory Competition and the Takings Clause, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 87, 131 n.136 (1996) (arguing
that competitive pressures among jurisdiction will also make it less likely that municipalities will effect takings
through legislative acts than through individualized, site-specific regulation).
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tend to respect this distinction and extend Nollan and Dolan only to individualized exactions,100
although some courts,101 with the approval of some commentators,102 have nevertheless applied
heightened scrutiny to legislatively enacted exactions.
III.

Takings Formalism, Regulatory Formulas.
In their logic and metrics, Nollan and Dolan are instances of the Supreme Court’s

uneven, gradual imposition of a more robust Takings jurisprudence that provides stronger
protection for property owners against land use regulations. Like other categorical exceptions to
the multi-factor, ad hoc balancing test that generally applies to Takings claims, Nollan and
Dolan’s “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” tests require courts to apply heightened
scrutiny to challenged land use regulations. Below I assert that the Court’s explicit purpose in
formulating these tests was to protect property owners and the classical liberal conception of
property from the incursion of powerful, overreaching government agencies. I associate this
move with the Court’s similar desire to protect property owners from state and lower federal
courts that might, despite the Court’s tests, still issue decisions that uphold local governments’
“extortion” through exactions. To create a doctrinal shield that would sufficiently protect
property rights, the Court has attempted to articulate a fairly tight, rule-based command to lower
100

See, e.g., Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Arizona v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 1000 (Ariz. 1997) (refusing
to extend Dolan to legislative water resources development fee); San Remo Hotel, 41 P.3d at 103 (refusing to extend
Nollan and Dolan to generally applicable fee for converting residential hotel room); Krupp v. Breckenridge
Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 697 (Colo. 2001) (refusing to apply Dolan to, and subsequently upholding, generally
applicable sewer fees); Arcadia Dev. Corp. v. City of Bloomington, 552 N.W.2d 281, 286 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996);
Rogers Machinery, 45 P.3d at 966 (refusing to apply heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan to a legislatively
determined “system development charge” of traffic impact fees levied by local government under authority of state
statute).
101
See Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. v. South Dakota, 236 F.Supp.2d 989, 1026-29 (D.S.D. 2002) (applying Nollan and
Dolan to state eminent domain statute requiring private railroads that use statute to acquire land to grant easement to
other public entities and groups) (D. S.D. filed Dec. 6, 2002); Home Builders Ass'n of Dayton and Miami Valley v.
Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349 (Ohio 2000); Lincoln City Chamber of Commerce v. Lincoln City, 991 P.2d 1080,
1082 (Or. Ct. App. 1999), rev. denied, 6 P.3d 1101 (Or. 2000); Isla Verde, 990 P.2d at 429.
102
See, e.g., Breemer, supra note 95, at 401-07 (2002) (arguing that, whether understood as relying on the Takings
Clause or the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, Nollan and Dolan should apply to legislative as well as
adjudicative exactions).
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courts and government agencies, one that limits exactions to the abatement of nuisance-like
impacts caused by the proposed land use. At once clear—exactions must pass tests of nexus and
proportionality—and indeterminate—the reach of these tests is expansive and indeterminate—
the Court’s commands have affected land use regulation in important ways. Specifically, they
have helped lead to the increased use of regulatory formulas rather than individualized,
negotiated exactions.
This Part establishes the linkage between doctrine and regulatory practice through a
series of related claims. It begins by placing Nollan and Dolan’s formalist desire—composed of
a particular jurisprudential vision of rule-like commands and a normative vision of robust
property rights—within the Court’s general trend towards excepting certain types of regulatory
acts or effects from the generally applicable deferential standard for takings claims. The first
three sections thereby establish what the Article means by “takings formalism.” The final
section describes the result of this vision of takings in the context of exactions: a trend among
state and local governments of movement away from negotiated, ad hoc exactions and towards
legislated, fee-based formulas as a preconstituted remedy for the harms and costs of all relevant
development proposals. Although it cannot be proved that Nollan and Dolan caused this trend, I
note that their combined clarity and indeterminacy give local governments strong incentives to
adopt such exaction formulas in order to avoid or successfully defend against constitutional
challenges to the resulting exactions, and that the limited empirical evidence to date on the cases’
impact shows some significant effect.
A.

Takings Rules and the Desire for Doctrinal Clarity.

In establishing separate, heightened scrutiny of certain categories of alleged takings, the
Supreme Court has carved out exceptions to the ad hoc, fact-intensive balancing approach it has
25

established as the dominant test for regulatory acts that require compensation.103 Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City established the “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries” of
alleged regulatory takings,104 which require courts to balance, among other things, “[t]he
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant”105 and “the character of the governmental
action.”106 The two most widely recognized categorical exceptions to the Penn Central test
concern government acts that effect a permanent physical occupation of land, typically
associated with the Court’s decision in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,107 and
those that deny an owner “all economically beneficial uses” of her land, as established in Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council.108 The “permanent physical occupation” category
constitutes a conceptually narrow and rare outer boundary of land use regulation that, in the
opaque universe of takings law, is relatively easy to spot and administer. The “denial of all
economic use” rule is, at least in the abstract, also an easily identifiable outlier of land use
regulation’s effects that requires application of a simple command: If the regulation renders the
property valueless, a court must apply a particularized type of heightened scrutiny to determine if

103

See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (explaining that in reviewing regulatory takings challenges, courts generally
eschew set formulas and instead engage in “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries”); see also Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) (reaffirming Penn Central approach as default for judicial review of regulatory
takings claims); id. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (same); Gary Minda, The Dilemmas of Property and
Sovereignty in the Postmodern Era: The Regulatory Takings Problem, 62 U.COLO. L. REV. 599, 612 (1991);
Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1681-82 (1988).
104
438 U.S. at 124.
105
Ibid.
106
Id. at 124. The extent of the Court’s invitation to balance has reached absurd lengths in California, where the
Supreme Court has articulated thirteen different, potentially relevant factors for consideration, and where courts
occasionally weigh all thirteen in the balance. See Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 941 P.2d 851, 86061 (1997) (listing and explaining factors); see, e.g., Massingill v. Dep’t of Food & Agriculture, 102 Cal.App.4th
498, 507-08 (2002) (applying factors).
107
458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982). The physical invasion test may not be as simple as it appears, however. See Joseph
William Singer & Jack M. Beerman, The Social Origins of Property, 6 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 217, 224-28 (1993); see
also Poirier, supra note 14,at 108 n.56 (citing cases that complicate physical invasion rule).
108
505 U.S. at 1019.
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the regulation does not in fact require compensation.109 With respect to takings claims that do
not fall within the ambit of one of these categories, the Court “still resist[s] the temptation to
adopt per se rules . . ., preferring to examine ‘a number of factors’ rather than a simple
‘mathematically precise’ formula.”110
Proponents of takings rules claim there are a number of advantages to clear declarations
of the extent of property owners’ constitutional rights and to simple tests for courts to ascertain
whether a regulatory action violates those rights. First and foremost, clear takings rules could
enhance decisional and allocative efficiency.111 By limiting the discretion of judges and
administrative decisionmakers in evaluating whether any regulation or its application would
109

Nevertheless, the latter category, typically referred to as the Lucas category in honor of the decision establishing
it, is subject to numerous complications. At least two additional major questions remain about Lucas, however.
First, Lucas excepts from its compensation requirement for regulations that render land valueless those background
principles of the common law of property and nuisance that limit the property owner’s antecedent rights to use and
develop her property. See id. 1027. This simply begs the question of how courts administer the unknown and
possibly indeterminate exceptions that Lucas establishes under which the government may nevertheless avoid
paying compensation despite its regulation’s denial of all economic value. Second, as the dissents and concurrence
raise in Lucas itself, it is the rare regulation that reduces a parcel’s value to zero, and it may not have even been the
case for the Lucas plaintiff’s land. See id. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring), 1044 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 1065
n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 1076 (statement of Souter, J.); see also Wyer v. Board of Envtl. Prot., 747 A.2d 192
(Me. 2000) (holding that where property retains value for “parking, picnics, barbecues, and other recreational uses,”
a law protecting dunes that prohibits construction on a building lot does not fall within Lucas category). Given the
benefit to plaintiffs of falling within the Lucas category, parties will likely expend significant effort in litigating the
issue of economic value. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1065-66 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
A third complication was resolved by the Court in its recent decision in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc.
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002). There, the Court considered the issue of whether a
moratorium rendering a property owner’s parcel temporarily valueless effects a categorical taking. In doing so, the
Court considered whether a parcel could be conceptually severed—in terms of time as well as space—for purposes
of a takings analysis. That is, if a regulation rendered part of a larger parcel valueless, or a parcel valueless for a
period of an owner’s fee simple absolute, could the property owner utilize Lucas to seek compensation for that part
or period? The Court clearly rejected a temporal severance approach in Tahoe-Sierra, and seemed also to resolve
the spatial severance issue similarly. See id. at 331 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31) (declaring that the
denominator, or the parcel under review in an alleged takings, is the “parcel as a whole” rather than the regulated
portion, and upholding a series of development moratoria and in the process making it more difficult for property
owners to be compensated for delays during which their property is denied economic value); see generally Poirier,
supra note 14, at 109-11 (2002) (summarizing long-standing debates over denominator issue and Tahoe-Sierra’s
possible role in settling them); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1192 (1967) (initially establishing debate over
denominator issue).
110
See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 326 (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633, 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
111
See Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi, Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, 86 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1449
(2000); Thomas Ross, Modeling and Formalism in Takings Jurisprudence, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 372, 416-17
(1986).
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effect a taking, clear constitutional commands promise a level of value-neutral doctrinal
coherence, which ostensibly would enable the smooth deduction of regular results across
disparate, individual cases.112 Such stability would force fairness and predictability across
decisions, with the result that like cases would be treated equally by decision-makers who would
waste few resources in applying a clear rule to resolve every dispute.113 Coherence,
predictability, and fairness in turn would affect the behavior of property owners and investors,
who typically view rule-bound certainty as better protecting their expectations than the ex post
nature of the Court’s ad hoc balancing tests. The stability promised by formalist takings rules
thus would invite individuals to commit resources to capital projects, and therefore enables the
highest and best use of property.114
A second advantage of takings rules, according to some advocates, is that they would
establish and help enforce increased protection for property owners embattled by the regulatory
overreach of local, state, and federal governmental entities. Formal takings rules would thereby
smooth the “frictions” caused by the struggles over regulatory indeterminacy and uncertainty,
stabilizing and protecting property rights within the present distribution of property ownership
and entitlements.115 Seen from this angle, categorical takings tests deploy formal rules in order
to redistribute power from local government to property owners; thus, they further a normative

112

See Ross, supra note 111, at 416-17.
Scholars who advocate clear rules cite this as a general advantage of clear commands over ad hoc standards. See
Larry Alexander, “With Me, It’s All ‘er Nuthin’”: Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 530, 532-36
(1999); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178-80 (1989).
114
See Rose-Ackerman & Rossi, supra note 111, at 1449.
115
See Epstein, supra note 1, at 490-91. Theoretically, clear rules could be articulated and enforced in favor of
government regulation and against property rights. For example, instead of an ad hoc balancing test for partial
takings, a constitutional takings rule could command that any regulation that leaves 90% or less of the value of the
subject property does not require compensation. This rule, too, would provide decisional efficiency, at least in the
abstract—but as in Lucas, litigation would occur over the remaining value of the subject property. See supra note
109.
113
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vision and narrative of judicial intervention against an expansionist regulatory state.116 Rulebased formalism in the takings context, then, links a set of clear rules to a classical liberal
conception of broad, static, and well-protected property rights.117
Underlying the utilitarian and normative claims about categorical regulatory takings is a
jurisprudential desire for formal and doctrinal stability.118 In the areas in which they operate,
categorical rules dictate to state courts and state and local legislatures “the jurisprudential spirit
in which their general laws of property and nuisance are to be read and construed.” 119 This
“spirit” in turn forces states to establish land use regulatory regimes that take the form of
“monadic, specific rules [rather than] that of complexly interactive open principles.”120 The
formalist desire of an occasional majority of the Supreme Court has been incompletely
instantiated within the bifurcated structure of current takings law, leaving the majority of alleged
takings untouched121 and specific issues within categories unresolved.122 Although their inroads

116

See Gregory S. Alexander, Takings, Narratives, and Power, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1752, 1753-54 (1988).
See MARGARET JANE RADIN, The Liberal Conception of Property: Crosscurrents in the Jurisprudence of
Takings, in REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 120, 133-35 (1993).
118
See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE
MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 238-39 (1990); Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property,
108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1219-20 (1999). To the extent that the Court’s rule-formalism is linked to its normative
commitment to protect property rights, it clearly manifests a desire to limit the possibility for judicial discretion that
would undercut property rights. I use the term desire, whether for rules or for a whole and identifiable conception of
property rights, in its intentionalist, psychological, and psychoanalytic implications. See STANLEY FISH, THERE’S
NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH, AND IT’S A GOOD THING, TOO 143 (1994) (tying formalism’s popularity to the
appeal of its purported ability to resolve problems and disputes); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Defensor Fidei: The
Travails of a Post-Realist Formalist, 47 FLA. L. REV. 815, 832-33 (1995) (describing psychological attractions of
formalism); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the Disaggregation of Property,
93 MICH. L. REV. 239 314-19 (1994) (describing psychoanalytic desire for discernible conception of property).
119
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and Judicial Conservatism,
35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 327 (1993).
120
Id.
121
See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322, 332 (distinguishing condemnations and physical takings from regulatory
takings, and characterizing Lucas as representing a rare departure from the default fact specific inquiry for
regulatory takings); Rose-Ackerman & Rossi, supra note 111, at 1446; see also Gregory S. Alexander, Ten Years of
Takings, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 586, 594 (1996) (describing Supreme Court’s formalist interventions as symbolic and
of limited application).
122
See supra Part II.C.
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into the Takings “muddle”123 may be limited and their own stability may be vulnerable in
practice and questionable in principle, formal, categorical takings rules at least bear “the feel of
legality”124 and provide a “good dose of formalization” to the presumptively open ground of
takings.125 Thus, the occasionally triumphant desire for clarity, precision, and protection has
produced exceptional and categorical formal rules that depart from default, multi-factor
balancing tests. The two sections that follow explain how Nollan and Dolan fit within this
general effort to stabilize and protect property rights under the Takings Clause.
B.

Nexus and Proportionality as Doctrinal Shields.

The Court intended Nollan’s nexus test and Dolan’s rough proportionality test to serve as
doctrinal shields, protecting property owners and the integrity of private property rights against
the effects of local governments’ unchecked monopoly over their police powers. Concerned that
local governments used their monopoly regulatory power to require vulnerable individuals to
cede their constitutionally protected right to exclude others from their property, the Court in
Nollan and Dolan assumed that property owners seeking issuance of a discretionary approval are
powerless—they have no option but to agree to the conditions imposed by the local government,
and they have no leverage that would enable them to bargain their way to a better deal. The
Court’s intent in Nollan and Dolan was to protect property owners from the forced, inequitable
bargains that result from the presumptively inequitable distribution of power in the relationship
between the land use regulatory body and the regulated individual property owner.126

123

Carol Rose coined the term “muddle” for the complicated, often confusing appearance of modern takings law.
See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984).
124
Michelman, supra note 12, at 1628.
125
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1697, 1700 (1988);
see also Michelman, supra note 12, at 1622 (describing noticeable movement of Court “towards a reformalization of
regulatory-takings doctrine”).
126
See, e.g., Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385-86 (“Petitioner contends that the city has forced her to choose between the
building permit and her right under the Fifth Amendment to just compensation for the public easements.”); Nollan,
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In Nollan, the Court made this suspicion explicit, characterizing the lateral beach
easement required of the Nollans as “an out-and-out plan of extortion.”127 Finding no
relationship between the California Coastal Commission’s stated justification and the means
used to achieve those ends, the Court implied that the government had engaged in little more
than a sleight of hand meant to disguise its strong-arm tactics as a logical and permissible
regulatory act. But the exaction’s demonstrable illogic, the Court held, made the extortion plan
manifest, and the essential nexus test, by requiring application of a particular logic, can uncover
such constitutionally impermissible efforts.128
The Court’s further uncovering of municipal extortion explicitly appeared in Dolan in its
invocation of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.129 As the Court described it, this doctrine
prohibits the government from “requir[ing] a person to give up a constitutional right—here the
right to receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use—in exchange for a
discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit sought has little or no
relationship to the property.”130 The rough proportionality test precludes a forced exchange in
which the property owner is coerced by a deceitful and untrustworthy governmental entity to
cede the full complement of rights in her land—a concession that would otherwise require
compensation under the Fifth Amendment—as a condition for receiving the permit required to

483 U.S. at 841-42 (characterizing Coastal Commission’s actions as compelling Nollans to contribute land to the
public when it was required to utilize its eminent domain power to pay for the land); see generally Fennell, supra
note 13, at 15 (describing Supreme Court’s implicit distrust of local governments in its exactions cases).
127
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (internal citation and quotation omitted).
128
See id. (“[T]he lack of nexus between the condition and the original purpose of the building restriction converts
that purpose to something other than what it was.”).
129
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385; see also id. at 387 (quoting Nollan’s characterization of exactions that lack an essential
nexus as “an out-and-out plan of extortion”).
130
Id. at 385. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine was also implicitly invoked in Nollan. See Been, supra note
13, at 474; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1463 (1989).
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intensify the use of that land.131 By imposing a metric that identifies when a required concession
has forced a property owner to bear unfairly the entirety of public burdens,132 the rough
131

I assume throughout this Article that Nollan and Dolan are better understood as takings cases analogous to
unconstitutional conditions precedents, rather than as unconstitutional conditions cases with a takings overlay. The
Court’s reasoning and analysis in Nollan and Dolan clearly emphasized takings precedents over a thorough
discussion of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. As in other takings cases, the Nollan and Dolan decisions
begin their analysis with the regulatory act’s effect on property rights, stressing in both cases that the dedication
requirement constituted a “permanent physical occupation” that removed from the plaintiffs’ bundle of property
rights the essential stick of the right to exclude. See, e.g., Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384 (characterizing required dedication
of easement as akin to permanent physical occupation of land in its deprivation of right to exclude); id. at 393-94
(emphasizing that loss of right to exclude denied the property owners a fundamental right of property owners);
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831-32 (same). The Court then applied the standard test for contemporary takings analysis,
which asks whether the regulation “substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests.” Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385
(citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-35 (same). Assuming (in Nollan) or
conceding (in Dolan) that the state’s interests were legitimate (see Dolan, 512 U.S. at 387; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 83536), the Court devised the essential nexus and rough proportionality tests to evaluate whether the conditions that
effected takings for which compensation was due substantially advanced those interests. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at
837 (describing essential nexus standard as test to evaluate whether “the condition substituted for the prohibition . . .
fails to further the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition”); see also Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386
(characterizing rough proportionality standard as logical second test for exactions that applies more precise standard
to evaluate whether the state’s legitimate interest is substantially advanced).
Ultimately, the Court’s reliance on takings rather than unconstitutional conditions may be because,
notwithstanding Justice Rehnquist’s strange claim in Dolan that the latter doctrine is “well-settled,” the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is perhaps even more indeterminate than the muddled Takings clause
jurisprudence. Compare Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385, with Sullivan, supra note 130, at 1416 (describing judicial
application of doctrine as “riven with inconsistencies”); and Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem
of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1304 (1984) (complaining of inconsistent judicial
application of the doctrine so marked “as to make a legal realist of almost any reader”). Attempts to impose
theoretical coherence to the doctrine have failed to settle the field in the least. See generally Mitchell N. Berman,
Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 4-6 (2001)
(summarizing earlier attempts, noting their failures, and offering still another such attempt). Nollan only implicitly
invokes the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, makes no mention of either the doctrine or any cases (including
Dole v. South Dakota, a decision explicitly relying upon the unconstitutional conditions doctrine that had been
decided earlier in the same term) that apply the doctrine, and includes little more than unspecific citations to two
free speech cases decided within the unconstitutional conditions rubric. Compare South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S.
203 (1987) (upholding, after thorough discussion and application of unconstitutional conditions doctrine, federal
program conditioning highway funding on states’ imposition of a minimum drinking age) with Dolan, 512 U.S. at
385 (citing only Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); and Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School
Dist. 205, Will Cty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).
At minimum, the Court’s willful lack of interest in working through the difficult uncertainties of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine and its comparatively fulsome efforts in sorting precedent and doctrine in the
takings field demonstrate the Court’s recognition that Dolan is best understood as a Fifth Amendment case with
some coloring from unconstitutional conditions doctrine. See generally Fennell, supra note 13, at 45 (asserting that
in exactions context the unconstitutional conditions doctrine plays a secondary role to the substantive Takings
doctrine by serving as a “lens for monitoring the things that the government is attempting to receive and give”); but
see Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 976 n.331 (2000) (arguing
that Dolan is an unconstitutional conditions, rather than regulatory takings, case); Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City
of Tigard: Constitutional Rights as Public Goods, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 859 (1995) (reading Nollan as an
unconstitutional conditions case that protects the society-wide benefits of the Takings Clause against expansive
regulations that inefficiently allocate real property resources); EPSTEIN, supra note 86, at 180-83 (reading Nollan as
an unconstitutional conditions case providing necessary, but second-best, protection for property owners under siege
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proportionality test extended Nollan’s effort to uncover constitutionally impermissible exactions.
Nollan and Dolan thereby provide doctrinal shields that protect property owners who are most
vulnerable to the police powers’ exercise when local governments, susceptible to majoritarian
influence,133 overregulate undeveloped land and exploit individuals and newcomers.134
In addition to its concern with the government’s unfair use of its bargaining power, the
Court in Nollan and Dolan also noted the inefficiencies that it predicted would follow if the
judiciary failed to intervene in the exaction bargaining process. This is consistent with what
commentators have noted are the dual concerns of Takings Clause jurisprudence with fairness
and efficiency.135 The dual concern is clearest in Dolan, which specifically requires careful,
individualized determinations to ensure that exactions “relate[] both in nature and extent to the
impact of the proposed development” in order to limit them to no more than the internalization
from expansive land use regulations that should be, but are not, declared unconstitutional). When it explicitly
invoked the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, then, the Court in Dolan implicitly adopted Cass Sunstein’s
suggestion that it substitute the set of specific questions it has developed and applied inconsistently in the
unconstitutional conditions context with a more specific inquiry into “first, the nature of the incursion on the
relevant [constitutional] right [made vulnerable by an extortionate condition by the state], and second, the legitimacy
and strength of the government's justifications for any such incursion.” Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L.
REV. 593, 620-21 (1990).
132
See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
133
See William A. Fischel, Introduction: Utilitarian Balancing and Formalism in Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1581, 1582 (1988) (“Local governments are more prone to majoritarianism than other levels of government because
they usually lack the electoral diversity that comes with large land area and large population and because, as
derivative governments, they also lack the other constitutional checks on the will of the majority, such as bicameral
legislatures and separation of powers.”); see also FISCHEL, supra note 13, at 137 (observing that legislation by the
national legislature should be given higher judicial deference than local legislative acts because it is less susceptible
to majoritarian capture).
134
Mark W. Cordes, Policing Bias and Conflicts of Interest in Zoning Decisionmaking, 65 N.D. L. REV. 161, 195
(1989) (arguing that the land use regulatory process is especially susceptible to bias among large, homogenous
factions).
135
See Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV.
997, 998-99 (1999); see also Michelman, supra note 109, at 1181-82 (relying on normative criteria of allocative
efficiency and distributive justice to judge collective action). Courts more typically emphasize the fairness rationale,
however. See Del Monte Dunes, 119 S.Ct. at 1635 (“[C]oncerns for proportionality animate the Takings Clause.”);
Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 528-29 (1998) (plurality opinion) (finding a regulatory taking where the
retroactive burden was “substantially disproportionate to the parties’ experience”); Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617-18
(stating that Takings Clause is intended to prevent government from “forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole”) (quoting Armstrong, 364 U.S.
at 49).
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by the property owner of the external costs of development.136 According to the Court, this test
curbs the government’s authority to force upon property owners a trade whose costs to them are
greater than the benefits it provides to the public.137 Nollan relied on the same claim. In the
absence of judicial intervention, the Court assumed, municipalities would increase their
bargaining leverage by producing more stringent land-use regulations, only to waive them in
exchange for even more beneficial, unrelated amenities.138 This would lead local governments to
realize fewer of the land-use goals they purportedly sought to meet than if they imposed more
lenient but nontradeable development restrictions.139
In Nollan and Dolan, then, the Court posited that municipalities have the incentives and
authority both to overregulate, by establishing stricter controls than they otherwise would
promulgate, and to underregulate (at least in contrast to their stated aim in establishing land use
ordinances and regulation), by using their enhanced bargaining leverage to bargain for even
greater, unrelated amenities.140 The Court assumed that local governments would, in the absence
of judicial intervention, extort property from their citizens and regularly shift between strategic
over- and underregulation, thereby harming all of the jurisdiction’s property owners and
residents. Nollan and Dolan accordingly sought to protect the regulators, the regulated, and
affected third parties alike from local governments’ overreaching, rent-seeking tendencies.
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Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
See id. at 393-95 (evaluating conditions required of the Dolans, and concluding that each requires too much in
light of the impacts of the proposed development).
138
See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 n.5.
139
Id.
140
See Been, supra note 13,at 491 (“Requiring a local government to spend exactions on projects that are germane
to the harm the development causes limits the potential profit from overregulation and thereby helps to ensure the
efficient level of regulation.”). One of the strongest and most influential arguments doubting the ability and
willingness of local governments to regulate fairly and efficiently is Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth
Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385 (1977).
137
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As a broad assertion, the Court’s narrative of the good guys and bad guys of local land
use regulation is unpersuasive on a number of grounds. First, the Court ignored the extent to
which parties adversely affected by local government decisions and deferential state courts have
recourse to higher and competing legislative bodies. Affected property owners and developers
may, and often do, seek assistance from state governments to provide statutory protections
against rent-seeking, exploitative behavior by local governments.141 Such assistance may come
in the general forms of state takings statutes that provide more protection than federal
constitutional guarantees142 and of more specifically targeted legislation that limits the authority,
scope, and extent of the exactions municipalities may impose.143
Second, the Court failed to recognize that property owners may seek friendlier land use
regulatory regimes in other jurisdictions.144 Indeed, jurisdictions may actively compete for
particular development projects, offering not merely to waive exactions and cede other
regulatory authority but to provide incentives to attract certain types of development.145
Utilizing an opportunity to exit is an individual’s response to her frustrated financial, social, and

141

See Carol M. Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121, 1037-39 (1996) (reviewing WILLIAM A.
FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS (1995)).
142
See Carl P. Marcellino, The Evolution of State Takings Legislation and the Proposals Considered During the
1997-98 Session, 2 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB POL’Y 143 (1998-99); Mark W. Cordes, Leapfrogging the Constitution:
The Rise of State Takings Legislation, 24 ECOLOGY L. Q. 187 (1997).
143
See MANDELKER, supra note 18, at § 9.21.
144
See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956) (developing
hypothesis of consumer-voters sorting themselves based on preferences for package of taxes, services, and
amenities). Of course, local governments can only offer distinct public goods to the extent that they have the legal
authority (to tax, spend, and regulate) and fiscal ability to do so. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER
HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE
POLICIES (2001). Moreover, the Tiebout hypothesis can only explain the exit and entrance of those individuals with
the capacity and wealth to opt out and in to communities; obviously, no one would “choose” to opt in to poor local
services. See Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 28-34 (1998). As noted below, some property
owners or developers may be better able to exit than others—an argument that leads inexorably to a contextualist,
balancing approach to takings claims, rather than to a formulaic, rule-like command for judicial review.
145
See Fred P. Bosselman, Dolan Works, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES, supra note 95, at 350; Been, supra
note 13, at 511-28.
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political expectations.146 But the Court ignores the exit option available to property owners who,
faced with an unfriendly, overregulating jurisdiction, may simply move to a friendlier one and,
as a result, damage the first jurisdiction’s property values and tax base.147 Assuming that local
governments are more susceptible to corruption or more likely to extort not only undervalues the
role of exit, but it also overvalues the roles of coalition politics and interest group pluralism that
would lead majoritarian local governments to exploit vulnerable property owners.148
Third, the Court assumed the political victimhood of a broad class of potential takings
plaintiffs despite differences in their intentions, political leverage, wealth, and property. The
developers that slow growth jurisdictions most tend to fight (either with denials or stringent
exaction requirements) may be “high-stakes players,” capable of seeking their own financial or
political solutions to instances of attempted coercion through their own political voice,149 or of
simply abandoning the jurisdiction. Large developers are not the only potential takings plaintiffs
who can fend for themselves. Owners of undeveloped property that developers might buy can,
in many instances, both constitute an interest group themselves and form political alliances with
developers.
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See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN,
AND STATES 15-17 (1970).

EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS,
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Rose, supra note 24, at 882-87.
See Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. the Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism from the Attack on
“Monarchism” to Modern Localism, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 74, 89-93 (1989). The Court also undervalues the
importance of political voice, both as a bulwark against exploitation and, ultimately, as a crucial value in local
politics. See Part V-B, infra.
149
See NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS 120 (2001);
see also Deakin, supra note 40, at 106 (noting close ties between real estate development industry and elected
officials in local communities). For example, one or more property owners and developers can capture the local
government decision-making power, successfully organize their intense interest in gaining lucrative development
approvals over the dispersed interests of the majority of existing residents, and persuade their state legislature to
pass statutes that are favorable to development and remove the authority of local governments. See Dana, supra
note 13, at 1271-74. Carol Rose has characterized as “localism bashing” the pessimistic conception of local
government regulators as thoughtless objects of majoritarian influence. See Carol M. Rose, Takings, Federalism,
Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121, 1131-32 (1996) (reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS (1995)).
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At the same time, individual property owners needing discretionary approval for specific
and singular changes to their existing land use may be less able to gain the political leverage
necessary to counteract a local government’s efforts to exact extortionate concessions.150 These
are the kinds of property owners on whose side the Court intervened in Nollan and Dolan:
individual plaintiffs who owned relatively modest amounts of property, who were unable to find
similar property elsewhere, and who seemed especially vulnerable to political majorities.151 But
the decisions’ formalist conception of property ownership as a single category for purposes of
takings jurisprudence provides the greatest legal leverage and commercial advantage to those
who need the Court’s protections least—large scale developers who can purchase land in
different jurisdictions within a region, and who are quite capable of exercising their exit option
and of protecting themselves politically.
In situations where jurisdictions compete for development and property owners may exit
with relative ease or successfully engage in political lobbying, the Court’s story of powerful,
unchecked local governments is less accurate and persuasive, and the heightened judicial
scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan therefore may be not only unnecessary but also intrusive and
overly protective of wealthy, powerful interests.152 Nevertheless, some localities offer such
attractive natural or geographical amenities that their local governments may ignore their
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Prior to Nollan and Dolan, state courts were able to make this distinction between large scale development
interests and vulnerable small property owners. In one instance, a court declared that a more rigorous standard of
review of exactions was appropriate for challenges by individual property owners, on the assumption both that the
approval sought by a subdivider would have more impact on the community and that the subdivider would be less
vulnerable to majoritarian exploitation. See Wald Corp. v. Metro. Dade County, 338 So.2d 863, 864, 868 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1976).
151
Many of the Court’s takings decisions expanding property rights protections were litigated by the Pacific Legal
Foundation, who represented the Nollans and Dolans before Supreme Court. See generally Douglas T. Kendall &
Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical Analysis and Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 509, 539-42 (1998) (chronicling and criticizing the role of conservative legal advocacy groups in
finding sympathetic plaintiffs and litigating takings cases).
152
See Smith, supra note 35, at 30.
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competition and may not care—or indeed may hope—that new entrants will be scared away by a
rigorous regulatory regime.153 In such instances, those already-located developers and property
owners are “stuck” without an easy exit option from an unfriendly jurisdiction.154 The dynamics
of local governance and property ownership may thereby render individual plaintiffs especially
vulnerable to the vicissitudes of majoritarian political sentiment and administrative
overreaching.155 Accordingly, judicial scrutiny may be more necessary in some contexts and
unnecessarily intrusive and disruptive in others.
Attending to such variability and complexity of what Margaret Radin has called the
“recalcitrant practice” of property—“the stubborn situatedness of people and their property, and
the endless variations in property relations”156—is not a part of the Court’s approach, however.
The Court’s narrative of land use regulation relies on relatively stock figures of nearly
omnipotent government agencies and besieged property owners. The Court tells this story from
an individual rights-based perspective with a utilitarian flavor that ignores issues of
progressivity,157 sustainability, environmental aesthetics, and social and environmental justice.158
As a result, the Court’s solution to this narrative is a powerful doctrinal shield for the victims of
a widespread regulatory onslaught that may only exist in certain places at certain times. The
Court assumes that only a sufficiently robust—and, as the next section explains, sufficiently
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See Dana, supra note 13, at 1271 n.129,
EPSTEIN, supra note 86, at 184-85.
155
See FISCHEL, supra note 13, at 4-5, 9 (arguing that exit is not as available as an option at the local level as it is at
the state or federal level); but see Rose, supra note 149, at 1134-35 (arguing that exit is at least equally available at
the local, state, and federal levels).
156
Radin, supra note 12, at 265.
157
See Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741,781-90 (1999) (offering a progressive,
egalitarian conception of takings that considers the socioeconomic status of the affected landowner).
158
See generally Alyson C. Flournoy, In Search of an Environmental Ethic, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 63, 83-88
(2003) (listing and detailing various ethical impulses developed in the field of environmental ethics).
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formal—constitutional regime can limit the regulatory tendencies of overreaching local
governments.
C.

Nexus and Proportionality as Rule-Based Commands.

Admittedly, Nollan and Dolan articulate less clear rules than those commanding courts to
find virtually per se takings in regulations that result in the total deprivation of all economic use
of land or its permanent physical occupation. The mere imposition of an exaction does not effect
a taking; instead, courts must apply the nexus and proportionality tests to decide whether
compensation is due. Furthermore, as I explained above,159 the category of exactions to which
Nollan and Dolan apply is subject to a significant amount of confusion.160 Nevertheless, they
represent a similar effort to create stability and replicable precision for the judicial review of
exactions.161 But like the Court’s other formal, categorical takings tests, the nexus and
proportionality tests represent a clear desire to circumscribe judicial discretion in reviewing
exactions, and to do so in order further to establish broad protections for property rights and for
the conception of property generally.
Nollan and Dolan circumscribe discretion in two ways. First, the “essential nexus” and
“rough proportionality” tests require courts to apply focused and finite logic to the specific
impacts and mitigation on the subject property.162 As such, they differ strikingly from the
159

See supra Part II.C.
Of course, the Lucas category of takings is also subject to a certain degree of uncertainty because of issues
surrounding the valuation and denominator of the subject parcel. See text accompanying supra notes ___
161
See Rose-Ackerman & Rossi, supra note 111, at 1446 (associating Dolan with Lucas to the extent that both
attempt to formalize takings law, but do so incrementally and imperfectly).
162
Implicit in my argument is the assumption that when it established its federal constitutional rules to review
exactions in Nollan and Dolan, the Court had some choice, and that choice included a more open-ended inquiry that
resembled its ad hoc balancing test in Penn Central. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390-91 (choosing among different state
court tests, and rejecting deferential “reasonable relationship” standard). As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, the
Court in Dolan assumed, without proof, that it could simply adopt any test that state courts had developed—largely
based on state constitutional or unenumerated grounds and generally not on federal constitutional grounds—as
though that were the universe of proper choices for a new federal constitutional rule. Id. at 398-99 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). In short, the Court could have chosen to adopt the reasonable relationship test, or even simply applied
160
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comparatively open-ended inquiry of Penn Central, where the Court admitted its inability to
develop “any ‘set formula’ for determining when ‘justice and fairness’ require that economic
injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government.”163 Together, the nexus and
proportionality tests consider the direct causal relationship between the harm of the proposed
new use for the property, the regulation upon which the government relies in requiring the
challenged concessions, and the cost of the concessions and the likelihood that the concessions
would mitigate the harms.164 These tests narrow judicial review of exactions, focusing on harm
causation and abatement as the basis of exactions’ constitutional permissibility. Put another
way, the Court has declared that exactions to which Nollan and Dolan apply do not require
compensation when they are directed at and address the harms of the proposed land use, because
it is only when local governments so limit their exactions that they are not extorting rights from
property owners. In this scheme, harm causation and harm reduction serve both as the basis and
limit of exactions as a regulatory practice. To require more or different, in the Court’s view, is
both to overregulate beyond the basis of legitimate land use planning and to effect a taking by
going “too far.”165 Property rights advocates propose extending the rigorous, limiting logic of
this regulatory ceiling to all regulatory takings cases.166
Second and more significantly, Nollan and Dolan also provide direction in the form of
metrics to apply to the exaction’s nexus and proportionality to the proposed land use.167 Of

Penn Central’s ad hoc balancing test, but instead chose the more precise and confining nexus and proportionality
tests.
163
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123 (quoting Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
164
See Jan G. Laitos, Causation and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: Why the City of Tigard's Exaction
Was a Taking, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 893, 893 (1995) (explaining that a central inquiry in Dolan "involves causation:
does the exaction relate to the harm ‘caused’ by the new development?").
165
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 853 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415).
166
See Kmiec, supra note 95, at 1045.
167
See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (“[T]he city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required
dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.”); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837
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course, neither metric is exceptionally clear; indeed, each couples a fairly precise term—in
Nollan the adjective “essential” and in Dolan “proportional”—with an imprecise one—Nollan’s
“nexus” and Dolan’s “roughly.” But these combinations do not signify the Court’s desire to
obfuscate or be imprecise. In Dolan, for example, the Court explicitly rejected less precise
metrics developed in state courts that required “very generalized statements as to the necessary
connection between the required dedication and the proposed development” and were “too lax to
adequately protect petitioner’s right to just compensation.”168 Although the Court rejected as
“too exacting” a strict “uniquely attributable” test that would have required courts to measure
precisely the exaction against the proposed land use’s harms,169 it commanded lower courts to
measure exactions with a particular metric. Similarly, the Court in Nollan rejected as lacking
essential nexus a condition that “utterly fails to further the end advanced as the justification for
the prohibition.”170 Although wary of establishing a precise command, the Court clearly hoped
to provide some clear, rule-like protection for property owners.
Each decision thus carves out a specific set of judicial inquiries that provides a focused,
limited set of considerations (compare the condition to the purpose of the regulation and measure
the condition to the impact) and relatively clear, if not quite crystalline, computations for courts
to make (“essential” and “roughly proportional”).171 The argument that Nollan and Dolan’s tests
are “hardly beacons of clarity” in form, force, or application172 rests on the false assumption that
the category “rule” contains only simple, non-discretionary, non-contingent commands. But no

(citation omitted) (“[U]nless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban,
the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but ‘an out-and-out plan of extortion.’”).
168
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389. See supra Part II.A (describing pre-Nollan state court tests for exactions).
169
See supra note 55.
170
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
171
Cf. Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, the Supreme Court Solves the Takings Puzzle, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 147,
148 (1995) (praising Nollan and Dolan for establishing an “objective standard” for whether a taking has occurred).
172
Poirier, supra note 14, at 107 n.55.
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such absolute command can exist. Rules and standards operate in relation, not in absolute
contrast, to each other.173 Considered closely, the rule versus standard binary does not hold;174
instead, commands may be more or less particularistic, and more or less rule-based.175 Nollan
and Dolan provide significantly greater direction and content to courts than an open-ended ad
hoc balancing or reasonable relationship test,176 and in their efforts to do so demonstrate the
same desire for formal stability demonstrated in Loretto and Lucas.177 A permanent physical
invasion effects a taking; total diminution of value is likely to effect a taking; and an exaction
that bears no essential nexus or that is not roughly proportional to the impacts of a regulated land
use effects a taking. Notwithstanding their somewhat open texture, Nollan and Dolan limit
judicial discretion by prescribing what factors courts may consider when reviewing exactions for
alleged takings, and how courts may consider them.
D.

Nollan, Dolan, and the Doctrinal Bias Towards Regulatory Formulas.

At minimum, in at least some jurisdictions the exactions cases have likely affected
substantive decisionmaking and the costs of the regulatory review process.178 Nollan and
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See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 593-96 (1992).
See generally Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 383 (1985) (characterizing the rule/
standard binary as performing little more than an “arrested dialectic”).
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FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 52, 77-78, 113 (1991); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES 46 (1987).
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See generally Kaplow, supra note 173, at 621 (distinguishing rules, which give content to the law before those
subject to it act, from standards, which give content afterward).
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See Heller, supra note 118, at 1219-20.
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See DANIEL POLLAK, HAVE THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S 5TH AMENDMENT TAKINGS DECISIONS CHANGED LAND
USE PLANNING IN CALIFORNIA? 31, 82-83 (California Research Bureau, CRB-00-004, 2000); Jonathan M. Davidson
& Adam U. Lindgren, Exactions and Impact Fees--Nollan/Dolan: Show Me the Findings!, 29 URB. LAW. 427
(1997); Ryan, supra note 37, at 368. Such costs may be borne by, or shared with, the property owner, thereby
raising the cost of development. See id. at 366; c.f. Lincoln City Chamber of Commerce, 991 P.2d at 1080
(upholding city ordinance requiring land owner-applicant to submit civil or traffic engineer’s report demonstrating
that applicant could not be required to provide road, drainage, and sidewalk easements for land improvements,
because such requirements would not be roughly proportional to the estimated impact of the development). One
guide for land use attorneys suggests that counsel for developers or property owners hire their own economic
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in the approval or development agreement process. See Michael C. Spata, Decision-makers and the Administrative
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Dolan’s commands can apply to exactions imposed as part of a wide variety of land use
regulatory decisions, including those regarding subdivision approvals, rezoning, and
annexation.179 In states that had previously engaged in more deferential judicial review of
exactions, local governments that failed to comply with Nollan and Dolan, or local governments
that developed constitutionally permissible exactions but had failed to produce a sufficiently
detailed record to demonstrate compliance with Nollan and Dolan, have needed to change their
regulatory practices or face an increased likelihood of takings liability in light of Nollan and
Dolan.
Nollan and Dollan have also raised the risk of litigation and the incidence of property
owners’ threats to sue.180 A recent study of city and county planners in California found that
litigation threats have increased since Nollan, Dolan, and other important recent takings cases
expanding the rights of property owners to be compensated for regulatory takings.181 Those
California counties that have instituted strong growth controls, as well as the fastest growing
California cities, have been more likely to face an increased number of threats of litigation than
pro-growth counties and slower growing cities.182 Local governments bear the full risk183 of

Decision, in HOW TO LITIGATE A LAND USE CASE: STRATEGIES AND TRIAL TACTICS 55, 61 (Larry J. Smith ed.,
2000).
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Nollan and Dolan, 81 VA. L. REV. 1801, 1815 (1995). It perhaps goes without saying that threats to litigate can and
do result in lawsuits. See POLLAK, supra note 178, at 21-22.
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See id. at 16-17 (finding that more than half of the planners in counties that responded to survey reported a
marked increase in the number of threats of litigation in recent years and over the past decade); see also id. at 18
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See id. at 125-29.
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compensating the property owner for an exaction found to be unconstitutional as well as for
attorney’s fees;184 they may also be liable for compensation covering the temporary period dating
back to the imposition of the prohibited exaction.185 Threats to sue are therefore likely to have
some effect on decisionmaking.
Unsurprisingly, many jurisdictions have modified their regulatory behavior by
demanding more modest exactions or by changing the way in which the exactions they impose
are calculated.186 Although Dolan did not require a precise “mathematical calculation” in order
to meet its rough proportionality test,187 courts have required local governments to adopt and
apply fairly rigorous standards with defensible, continually updated methodologies and estimates
in order to support the concessions they exact from property owners.188 Even where local
governments review extensive engineering and planning reports before imposing an exaction,
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courts have nevertheless dismissed the municipality’s findings of rough proportionality.189
Indeed, Dolan itself rejected as constitutionally unacceptable a bicycle path exaction, despite the
city of Tigard’s mathematical calculation of the increased number of car trips the proposed store
expansion would create and a rough estimate of the decreased traffic congestion that the
completed bikepath would produce.190
As a result, in the years following Nollan and Dolan, local governments have shifted their
exactions practice towards imposing impact fees rather than in-kind exactions, especially those
that require the dedication of land.191 Two doctrinal issues in Nollan and Dolan favor this shift.
First, under a narrow reading of Nollan and Dolan’s reach, certain methods of imposing impact
fees are less likely to face heightened scrutiny than ad hoc, dedicatory exactions.192 When
derived before the fact in an impact fee ordinance and then applied to all similarly situated
property owners, exactions formulas establish a legislative, rather than adjudicative, basis for
189
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imposing exactions, thereby arguably avoiding the scope of Nollan and Dolan.193 Even better,
when such fees are imposed under the authority of state law,194 they may seem even more likely
to be fairly derived and imposed, insofar as the state statute may require nexus and
proportionality findings195 and property owners in other jurisdictions within the state may also be
subject to similar fees.196 Negotiated exactions appear perilous when compared to such
formulaic, legislated fees.197
Second, even if heightened scrutiny applies, formulaic exactions are more likely to
withstand the nexus and proportionality tests. Exactions designed using widely accepted
methodologies, such as those developed to calculate the costs and mitigation of the traffic and
school impacts of new development, appear less assailable as unproportional.198 Mathematical
formulas whose scale responds directly to predictable and quantifiable impacts and that are
quantified in terms of the dollar costs of harms and mitigation, seem likely to be more persuasive
to courts that either lack expertise in the area of land use planning or are protective of property
owners.199 Furthermore, because more complex equations within formulas can include
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individualized assessments of the impacts of a particular proposed land use, such formulas will
appear more likely to calculate rough proportionality.200
Third, once a municipality develops impact fee and exactions formulas, they serve as
administratively simple regulatory practices that can be used repeatedly for similar, recurring
development applications. In order to attract development, progrowth communities have long
established exaction schemes in advance to create a predictable and palatable project approval
regime.201 Legislative formulas applied mechanically can settle disputes wholesale, as opposed
to the more time-consuming and variable approach of designing individualized exactions.202
Municipalities may establish such formulas in, or based upon, comprehensive, long-range plans,
another factor likely to be persuasive to courts insofar as they therefore would appear more likely
to be part of an ordered, considered regulatory scheme rather than an effort to extort concessions
from individual landowners.203
Exactions practice at the local level has thereby become more cautious, systematic, and
related to pre-formulated planning decisions.204 Pushing local governments towards long-range,
comprehensive planning based on mathematical formulas is a fairly ironic, though not
unexpected,205 result of the Court’s exactions cases. In its logic and effects—testing for
proportionality and nexus, which leads to mathematical, legislative formulas—the Supreme
Court’s formalist approach to the constitutional law of exactions appears analogous to a certain
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conception of planning as a discipline and practice.206 Oddly, in its effort to protect property
owners by curbing overregulation, a conservative majority of the Supreme Court has endorsed
and enforced the regulatory logic of planning, with its claims of modern scientific and
engineering expertise, as a necessary intervention into the private ordering of land use.207 To
place this irony within Bruce Ackerman’s terminology, the Court’s efforts to provide an
Ordinary Observer’s conception of property—local governments should not extort property
rights from owners seeking to develop their land—have resulted in the legal tests and
administrative rules of the Scientific Policymaker.208 In the abstract, the development of
regulatory formulas is neither necessarily bad nor necessarily good, but it does have
consequences, affecting both the regulation of property owners and communities, and the
practices and legitimacy of local governance. Parts IV and V consider these consequences of
Nollan and Dolan’s efforts to establish formal clarity in exactions and local governments’
legislative, formulaic response.
IV.

Formalism, Formulas, and the Variability of Local Land Use Regulation: Nollan
and Dolan’s Consequences on Property Rights Protection and Regulatory
Efficiency.
As formal concepts, nexus and proportionality should lead to land use regulation that

settles and protects all property owners’ expectations of the broad extent of their property rights
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and that requires the full internalization of all external costs produced by any proposed new land
use.209 But given the variable political, economic, and environmental contexts of local land use
regulation, the formal protections Nollan and Dolan aspire to establish and the formulaic
regulations that are likely to result will not ultimately achieve the Court’s purposes of robust
property rights protection and utilitarian curbs on municipalities’ tendencies to overregulate.
Rather, Nollan and Dolan are more likely to lead to instances of under- and overregulation as
local governments step further back from engaging in ample consideration of development’s
harms, or respond by denying entitlements to property owners, or selectively ignore the Court’s
commands. Even local governments attempting to comply in good faith with the Court’s
constitutional commands may engage in costly, full-scale environmental review that fully
identifies and charges for all the anticipated harms of new development, only to face resistance
by recalcitrant, litigious property owners and a skeptical, empowered judiciary that concludes
such regulatory efforts effect a taking.
In short, the Court’s effort in Nollan and Dolan to impose its desire for takings rules fail
to provide a mechanical, universal solution to the messy diversity of locally devised and
administered regulation and is unlikely to achieve a uniform approach sufficient to fulfill their
dual purposes of protecting property rights and enabling more efficient regulation with rule-like
commands. Different local governments, working under different state laws and within specific
economic and political contexts, faced with diverse housing markets and unique environmental
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That is, if we assume that local government will seek to internalize all present and future costs that are known and
unknown, and if we assume that such costs could pass the nexus and rough proportionality tests, then Nollan and
Dolan could produce an ideal cost internalization akin to the assumptions of the common law trespass and nuisance
doctrines. See Robert H. Cutting, “One Man’s Ceilin’ Is Another Man’s Floor”: Property Rights As the DoubleEdged Sword, 31 ENVTL. L. 819 (2001) (attempting to utilize common law doctrines to require full internalization of
externalities).

49

resources and local amenities, respond differently to the Court’s commands.210 And implicit
within this Part and Part V, I argue that no single vision of property and takings law can suffice
to produce the kinds of flexible, contextualized responses to the regulatory needs and political
and social circumstances of land use disputes.211 This inherent variability not only makes the
Court’s efforts seem simplistic or duplicitous in their willful imposition of a singular narrative of
exploitation, but it also cannot help but undermine the Court’s formal approach. The unruly
ground of land use regulation and local politics lead, ultimately, to widespread, incremental
departure from the Court’s formal commands as well as, where jurisdictions obey the Court, to
consequences that are frustrating and disruptive to local governance. I consider below three
different possible adverse consequences: more underregulation when jurisdictions attempt to
comply with Nollan and Dolan and require insufficient exactions; more overregulation when
jurisdictions decide to deny development proposals rather than comply with the Court’s
commands; and no effect, when jurisdictions simply disobey the commands and continue to
require unconstitutional concessions.
A.

Result 1: Underregulation, Due to Insufficient Exactions.

When local governments—fearful of compliance and litigation costs, the risk of judicial
review under Nollan and Dolan, and the costs of takings liability—either fail to impose an
exaction or impose a less stringent exaction than they otherwise might, the exactions cases result
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in underregulation212 that effects givings213 to property owners.214 Indeed, some jurisdictions
have responded to Nollan and Dolan by seeking smaller concessions from property owners.215
The nexus and proportionality tests establish a ceiling to exactions bargaining; when an exaction
requires quantitatively or qualitatively too much, the victimized property owner has a
constitutional cause of action. No such protection—whether in the form of a constitutional right
to challenge an insufficient exaction or a statutory floor that would correspond with the
constitutional ceiling—exists for those who must pay the costs or suffer the consequences of an
exaction that requires too little of the property owner.216 Thus in imposing an exaction, a
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municipality faces pressure on one side from the intense interests of a potential litigant who may
be able to muster a political interest group of property owners, and, from the other side, the more
diffuse interests of a potential political interest group united around opposition to a specific
proposal or to certain types of development generally. In different communities, this balance
may tip differently, but in pro-growth or litigation risk-averse jurisdictions, Nollan and Dolan’s
heightened scrutiny provides a powerful weapon for property owners that third parties lack, and
will likely lead to less regulation and more unmitigated impacts.
Even assuming that in the wake of Nollan and Dolan local governments attempt to exact
the strongest concessions from property owners, the logic and metrics of nexus and
proportionality and the record required to demonstrate constitutional compliance may
nevertheless lead to underregulation. Quantitative showings of proportionality and formulas are
imperfect as tools for mitigating the impacts of new development because impacts may be
difficult to quantify and formulaic mitigation programs based upon future projections may not
mitigate impacts fully.217 Some impacts and mitigation programs, such as those that study the
effects of new development on traffic and forecast the road improvements necessary to address
those effects, are more readily and repeatedly studied, anticipated, and quantified.
Methodologies to establish impacts and related exactions to support improvements of drainage
systems, bicycle infrastructure, parks, in-town pedestrian walkways and rural and exurban hiking

else’s land, that leads the Court to apply the Takings Clause in Nollan and Dolan. That said, state law may provide
third parties with a cause of action for a judicial challenge of a local government’s final land use decision. See, e.g.,
Standard Zoning Enabling Act § 7 (authorizing appeals from decisions of board of adjustment by “persons . . .
aggrieved”); Butters v. Hauser, 960 P.2d 181 (Id. 1998) (neighboring landowner had standing to challenge ordinance
and issuance of discretionary permit authorizing radio transmission tower that, she alleged, was in close proximity to
her land and affected use of her electronic equipment); see generally MANDELKER, supra note 18, at §§8.02, 8.04
(discussing third-party standing to challenge land use decisions in state court).
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trails are less precise and reliable, and may be unable to withstand heightened scrutiny.218
Impacts to wetlands may be exceptionally difficult and expensive to mitigate, and may therefore
fail to pass muster under Dolan.219 Even those impacts that have been studied and modeled
extensively, like impacts on traffic, may be better addressed through mitigation programs that
lack clear nexus, such as contributions to mass transit programs or other alternative
transportation programs.220 Such mitigation programs are often not explicitly and entirely tied to
the proposed development, and it may be difficult to prove or quantify the nexus and
proportionality between the mitigation program’s benefits and the new development’s harms.221
But some, or even many, local governments may not even attempt to require mitigation
of all impacts from development. Local land use mitigation typically focuses on anthropocentric
impacts that have more political salience among voters, such as traffic, schools, and recreational
facilities.222 It tends to ignore or insufficiently consider the indirect costs of development, such
as the costs of traffic congestion and air pollution.223 Except where required by federal and state
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environmental law,224 some local governments are more likely to discount potential
environmental impacts, especially those that will spillover into other communities and those that
incrementally but cumulatively cause significant impacts.225 Local governments may not have
the political will to consider, identify, and require mitigation of such impacts, especially in the
costly manner required under Nollan and Dolan.
Consider, too, the dynamic Nollan and Dolan’s heightened scrutiny establishes between
judicial review and legislative prerogative. Determining a “roughly proportional” width of an
emergency access road or impact fee for the provision of fire service is an exceptionally difficult
and risky endeavor, especially where the issue before the local government is whether to require
an access road at all.226 When a property owner’s mitigation of impacts would be
disproportionately burdensome—when, for example, construction of an emergency access road
is exorbitantly expensive—local governments and residents may be unable under Nollan and
Dolan to force mitigation.227 Moreover, as one court recently held, where the required
emergency access road would be in an undeveloped area and would remain unfinished until the
surrounding parcels are developed, a local government may be unable to meet Nollan and
Dolan’s burdens if it fails to prove to a court’s satisfaction that the emergency road would be
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completed in the “foreseeable future.”228 On those grounds, the court ultimately overruled the
local government regarding the construction of the access road, and the property owner was able
to subdivide his land without dedicating a road suitable for emergency services.229 In this
respect, the proportionality test invites courts to perform a rough cost-benefit analysis—generally
a legislative, rather than judicial prerogative—to consider whether a costly concession for
mitigation is somehow proportional to the benefit it would provide.230 Given Nollan and
Dolan’s heightened scrutiny and bias in favor of protecting property rights, the cost-benefit
analysis courts undertake is unlikely to encompass the full range and extent either of a
development’s impacts or of the kinds of considerations that a local government takes into
account in imposing exactions.231
Nollan and Dolan’s formal logic is also likely to lead local governments to conceptual
errors that will cause underregulation. As a general matter, current dominant regulatory
practices too deeply discount the occurrence and cost of future harms, assuming only that
presently discernible impacts need to be considered and mitigated.232 Fixed regulatory formulas
may lead regulators to underestimate both the dynamic nature of property across time and the
relative uniqueness of any particular piece of land in its geographic location, environmental
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resources, and relationship to its surroundings.233 A regulatory approach that works at one time
and in one place by imposing a certain set of exactions on a particular land use may not work
later when existing and newly approved activities further deplete common pool resources. An
existing formula, and judicial skepticism and governmental fear about making that formula more
rigorous, may foreclose later responses to the decreasing supply of essential resources to serve
all property within the jurisdiction.234 Flexible, timely responses to the conditions causing
increasingly scarce or congested resources are essential political decisions that governments
make; the role of takings jurisprudence is to protect the individual from exceptional unfairness as
a result of the transition to a new land use regime,235 not to prevent such decisions being made in
the first place. A constitutional logic leading to regulatory formulas that cannot adapt to local,
regional, and national environmental changes ultimately provides greater individual property
rights than the Constitution requires, and as a result adversely affects political, social, and
environmental values made vulnerable to the entitlements these formulas create.236
In addition, the Nollan and Dolan approach, like that of common law nuisance, focuses
largely on the off-site impacts of development on common pool resources and public goods
(such as traffic and schools) that affect other residents and the natural and built environment that
surrounds the subject land. But even if impacts on the land outside the boundaries of the subject
233
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property are entirely internalized, a new development may not be sustainable over the long run
on the land for which it is proposed. Owners seeking to intensify the use of their land may have
incomplete information about their own long-term land use or may simply not care about the
sustainability of their land under its proposed use.237 Limiting exactions to off-site externalities
will also lead to the overprotection of property rights within the property owner’s parcel and
produce what Michael Heller has called an “anticommons” in which a powerful right to exclude
results in preventing the public from utilizing a rare and valuable resource at all.238 Considered
this way, the California Coastal Commission’s requirement that the Nollans cede a lateral beach
easement sought to prevent a tragedy of the anticommons by excluding the public from access to
the beach and public trust lands. The Court’s conclusion that the exaction effected a taking
recognized an overbroad right in a specific legal thing—the Nollans’ absolute, constitutionally
protected right to exclude the public from a particularly inviting part of their property—that
prevents an optimal social level of beach use.239
Because of their very nature, some impacts and some mitigation programs simply do not
lend themselves to the logic of Nollan and Dolan. If a local government cannot, or lacks
confidence in its ability to, prepare a record sufficient to withstand the heightened scrutiny of the
exactions cases, then a new land use will inevitably effect some degree of a giving to the
property owner and pass along some of the costs of development to others.
B.

Result 2: More Permissible Regulation, Due to Denials without Exactions.
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But in some jurisdictions, Nollan and Dolan may have the opposite effect. Fearful of the
risks and costs of litigation, local governments may decide not to bargain with property owners
over discretionary approvals, deciding instead to deny proposals that will be politically
unpopular or costly to the community without exactions that might be vulnerable to
constitutional challenge.240 A denial that leaves the subject property with sufficient value and
use and that does not frustrate the owner’s reasonable investment backed expectations will likely
not lose a constitutional challenge under the Penn Central ad hoc balancing test.241 Although a
developer or property owner might choose an expensive condition over an outright denial, the
fear of Nollan and Dolan may keep local governments from offering such conditions, or from
offering conditional approvals to developers who are more likely to sue.242 Rigid, legislatively
enacted formulas may be especially frustrating for developers and property owners because such
formulas can be difficult to change, even in the face of weakening markets, unlike more flexible
bargains with amenable governments.243 To the extent that Nollan and Dolan diminish local
governments’ willingness to bargain, the essential nexus and rough proportionality tests restrict
property owners’ ability to negotiate with a willing partner to a mutually agreeable position, and
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thereby leave them in a worse position than when they might at least have been able to bargain
their way to a more expansive use.244
This unintended consequence of the exactions cases is more likely to occur in certain
circumstances. Where mitigation of the impacts on an especially sensitive resource is expensive,
for example, a local government might be loathe to require (because a property owner may be
unwilling to pay) the cost of full mitigation, and is likely to deny the proposal.245 Nollan and
Dolan would ban creative deals in which, instead of mitigating the impact, the property owner
would provide some unconnected, less expensive, but politically popular offset.246 Similarly,
where a proposed project is politically unpopular and mitigation of its negative impacts is
insufficient to persuade the political majority, the offer of an unrelated but attractive and roughly
proportional amenity by the property owner may bring about an approval.247 A local government
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that would require or even accept amenity that lacks an essential nexus runs the risk of facing a
property owner’s challenge under Nollan.248 Finally, jurisdictions that have failed adequately to
force internalization of earlier developments may experience a political backlash against growth
due to adverse transportation, environmental, school, or recreational conditions. With existing
capital facility deficits, local governments may not wish to approve projects that only internalize
their new harms.249
In sum, the risk-averse jurisdiction that might otherwise be willing to bargain to an
approval is likely to deny a proposal that threatens to create harms. To the extent that property
owners would be willing to agree to exactions that fail the logic and metrics of Nollan and
Dolan, the Court’s efforts to protect property rights ultimately lead local governments to
overregulate and diminish owners’ ability to develop their property.250
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C.

Result 3: No Effect, Due to Non-Compliance.

Finally, in some instances and in some jurisdictions, bargains may simply take place
outside the constitutional parameters set by Nollan and Dolan. Local governments may be
willing to risk litigation in order to impose exactions that exceed constitutional limitations. This
is a likely result when there is strong political will for strict land use regulation. It will also
occur when a local government and a property owner sufficiently trust each other and the benefit
of the approval or development agreement is sufficient for the property owner to bear an
exaction that may be unconnected to, or may cost more than, the harms the proposed land use
would create.251 It may be easier and faster for the property owner simply to agree to the
exaction in order to receive the offered entitlement. In either instance, Nollan and Dolan will
have failed to curb the over-regulation they were intended to stop.
Sufficient trust is especially likely between parties that repeatedly transact business with
each other. “Repeat playing” developers who expect to interact again with the local government
or hope to avoid a reputation of being litigious among local governments within a region are
likely to be willing to waive their constitutional claims to obtain fast approvals and cultivate a
long-term relationship with the local government.252 New entrants into a local or regional
property development market may lack such an established relationship with regulators and, for
that very reason, may not be offered non-compliant exactions. This dynamic would adversely
affect the competitiveness of the local land development industry and the quality and price of
products offered.
251
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Thus, even if we assume that Nollan and Dolan would successfully protect the most
vulnerable small property owners (like the plaintiffs in those cases) from extortionate
overregulation, the decisions fail to impose standard, universal protection sufficient to achieve
the Court’s stated goals. In too many of the likely scenarios in which governments impose
exactions, Nollan and Dolan fail to protect or over-protect property rights and help cause
inefficient and unfair regulation. The Court’s effort to formalize judicial review and establish
uniform protections leave property owners, existing residents, and insufficiently protected
environmental resources vulnerable to regulatory approaches skewed in response to Nollan and
Dolan. The Court’s efforts will not necessarily improve the bottom lines and results of
exactions, and may in some instances actually impede better, more flexible concessions.
V.

Takings Formalism and the Narrowing of Local Governance and Property
Relations.
Part IV considered the effects of Nollan and Dolan on the substantive exactions local

governments impose. This Part focuses on the decisions’ effects on how local governments
consider and impose those exactions. The Court’s strong emphasis on individual rights and
secondary emphasis on utilitarian conceptions of regulatory efficiency fail to consider competing
and conflicting conceptions of local government and property as requiring and enabling political
and social relationships with others in a broader community.253 Takings formalism and
regulatory formulas limit the political ground upon which affected parties activate democratic
institutions and processes by voicing their claims, and frustrates the role that the social
embeddedness of property ownership plays in establishing community and a sense of social
253
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propriety. As inherently political and administrative means of flexibly resolving land use
disputes, exactions offer especially promising means of enabling legitimate and effective means
of responding to proposed development.
This Part elaborates on what is lost as a result of takings formalism and regulatory
formulas by focusing on land use’s place within local politics and on exactions an open-ended,
flexible means of achieving a political and administrative compromise to the disputes that arise
over development. Although some communities might choose rights-based and utilitarian
approaches to resolve development issues, others might choose otherwise and be better served by
seeking more inclusive means of debating and collectively resolving land use disputes than
through regulatory formulas. But the Court’s rule-like command puts communities that would
prefer more open-ended political and negotiated processes at risk of liability for compensation if
their resulting exactions fail to meet Nollan and Dolan’s criteria.
A.

Takings Formalism, Political Contest, and Land Use Decision-Making.

In Nollan and Dolan, the Court limited the judiciary’s role in reviewing challenged
exactions to evaluating the extent of an exaction’s precision. Absent from the Court’s logic and
metrics is any consideration of the political and social context of the bargain, the fairness and
openness of the proceedings leading to the exaction, or the long-term relationship among
community members.254 Put another way, the Court has made it constitutionally irrelevant
whether the political process by which the concession and entitlement were derived and
exchanged was fair or open to the concerns of all affected parties—all that matters, ultimately, is
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whether the resulting bargain meets the Court’s logic and metrics.255 Accordingly, those
regulatory means of meeting the constitutionally required logic and metrics—preconstituted
formulas that either avoid or are more likely to meet Nollan and Dolan’s tests—are inevitably
safer and more attractive for local governments than an open-ended political contest with
attendant political compromises.
The Court has thereby chosen to ignore the extent to which open-ended land use
regulatory processes may enable a more robust, legitimate, and inclusive local politics, one that
may yield substantively better resolutions to complicated and intractable local disputes than
abstract, preconstituted formulas.256 Local land use conflicts, and decisions about the
distribution of land use entitlements and the costs of development, are inherently and deeply
political. As such, democratic decision-making may not only be helpful or beneficial, but
necessary for a functional community. When decision-making processes enable the inclusion,
debate, and compromise of fundamentally opposed positions within the complicated matrix of
personal, social, environmental, and fiscal issues central to local government, they play an
important function in identifying and allowing contest over issues of local importance.257 In
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allowing political contest, they may increase the loyalty of residents who would consider
themselves part of a responsive and open political community.258
An exactions process that avoids the inevitably political questions about trade-offs
between property owners and the community merely frustrates citizens’ desires to become more
involved in land use decisions, thereby contributing to a sense of disillusionment and
demoralization regarding public life.259 This frustration may develop among neighbors and
environmentalists opposed to a project, as well as among property owners and developers who
would prefer to engage in political horse-trading and creative bargaining through exactions rather
than face outright denials of development rights. When political participation in land use
decisions is defined by the demand that decisionmakers deny a project because no negotiation is
possible, limits on exactions as a political solution may lead disputants to overcommit to an
absolute political position.260 As Albert Hirschman has noted, absolute political battles in which
participants enter with an uncompromising dedication to a single issue tend to produce in the
battles’ losers a sense of deep disappointment.261 And when government’s failure to consider
and represent constituent concerns seems institutionalized, and the affective, financial, and time
258
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commitments community members make to the regulatory process bring forth no return to the
community and to property owners, the resulting disappointment will lead to a retreat from
public life.262 In this context, administrative efficiency substitutes for and suppresses political
and social activity.
Disabling political contest over exactions thus also has wider effects on democratic
politics. Land use decisions are both an essential aspect of contemporary local American
governance and an excellent opportunity for individual stakeholders to seek political and social
involvement in an accessible set of institutions.263 Community members’ participation in the
land use process at least demonstrates a level of engagement often lacking in contemporary
federal and state politics.264 Land use politics is, in this sense, a gateway to political activism for
environmental and property-rights activism, as well as for interest in larger political issues for
the less active but still engaged participant. Withdrawing or limiting exactions as an outlet for
political debate and compromise may therefore affect not only the local issues surrounding a
development project, but may also lead to wider disengagement from even the most lively and
promising contemporary political forum.
The value of political contest and compromise over individualized, negotiated exactions
lies in what Frank Michelman has called the “generative tension” between popular democratic
rule and individual property ownership.265 Nollan and Dolan’s constitutional rule and

262

HIRSCHMAN, supra note 260, at 79-80, 93, 102, 129.
See Lea S. VanderVelde, Local Knowledge, Legal Knowledge, and Zoning Law, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1057, 1075
(1990).
264
See generally MATTHEW A. CRENSON & BENJAMIN GINSBERG, DOWNSIZING DEMOCRACY: HOW AMERICA
SIDELINED ITS CITIZENS AND PRIVATIZED ITS PUBLIC 189-93, 240 (2002) (contrasting citizens’ disengagement with
politics caused by centralized, institutional remedies to political problems, such as those used by the mainstream
environmental movement, to political engagement in localized NIMBY and land use political battles); ROBERT D.
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 344-46 (2000) (arguing that
citizens’ civic engagement in land use disputes and responses by local government are likely to raise social capital).
265
Michelman, supra note 236, at 1110.
263

66

administrative consequences diminish this tension. The Court’s narrow concern with abstract
conceptions of prepolitical property rights—rights removed from the historical situatedness of
political institutions and practices—insulate property from political decision-making and see
political disputes over property rights as dangers to avoid rather than as an integrative process for
democracy and individual rights.266 Formulaic quantification for its own sake—or to meet
constitutional standards—may lead to a shaping of environmental and planning values based
solely on that which can be quantified rather than on the interests of the community.267 The
same is true for an equally narrow concern with allocative efficiency that instantiates as a
primary regulatory model the pursuit of abstract utilitarian consequences, which are identified
and measured by distant, rational experts.268
Political contest certainly is not immune to failure or unfairness. In some contexts,
democratic decision-making may be dangerous and inefficient. Political decision-making
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processes may allow the eruption of intense conflict between factions and individuals that
disrupts and even destroys existing social ties and networks. Participants’ interests in disputes
may be parochial, even inequitable and exclusionary. But such conflict may itself be an
important means by which a locality or region identifies especially significant issues it must face
rather than suppress, and will thereby force decision-makers and interested parties to manage
current and future disputes.269 And where dangerously or unfairly parochial, inequitable, and
exclusionary interests prevail, judicial and state and federal legislative bodies have essential roles
in correcting local political errors.
Nor does privileging political contest require excluding formulaic, instrumental methods
where they are appropriate. Such methods can solve specific disputes or aspects of disputes,
especially in those instances when, within a specific political context, exactions would likely
effect an extortion of an individual’s property rights or would result in insufficient internalization
of development costs because of the capture of the decision-maker by development interests.
Legislatively imposed exaction formulas also provide a level of cost certainty and administrative
efficiency that individualized exactions and complex negotiations, by definition, do not.
Nevertheless, dispute is at the core of politics, and political contest is an important means
to resolve that dispute where the local political context would allow the contest to take place
fairly and inclusively.270 Formulaic exactions purged of individualized political dispute may
protect property owners from the vicissitudes of increased political participation and power by a
majority opposed to development, but their removal also eliminates the inclusion, contingency,
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and openness that might be found in the deal-making of political compromise.271 Politics
“consists of practices of settlement and unsettlement, of disruption and administration, of
extraordinary events or foundings and mundane maintenances”272—it consists, that is, of the ebb
and flow of political dispute.273 To rely merely on formal rules and regulatory formulas is to lose
the distinctive characteristic of local land use regulatory processes. These processes include a
“web of community understandings—sometimes highly idiosyncratic— about the way things
ought to be done,”274 and are constituted as well by the idiosyncrasies and peculiarities of local
public life, which may attract or repel residents and should, assuming no abrupt changes in those
particularities, allow those who are repelled to exit.275 Formulaic rules ultimately replace the
educational and transformative capacity of law and politics within the social institutions of local
government and local communities with the abstractions of numerical harms and costs.276 And
they ultimately undervalue the creative possibilities of political compromise and overvalue a
promised haven from democratic contest, unfairness, and inefficiencies through expertise and the
judicial protection of pre-political rights.277
B.

Takings Formalism and Local Dispute Resolution.

Exactions can play a mediating role in the land development process. They can enable
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interested parties to trade entitlements in pursuit of mutually beneficial results, and help bring
about community-based resolutions of contested land use disputes. Indeed, individualized
exactions’ value in allowing negotiated dispute resolutions is the necessary correlative to the
political value of allowing dispute in land use decision-making.278 In her influential work on the
“planning and dealing” of land use decisions, Carol Rose has argued that compromises arising
out of the political contests described in the previous section play important roles within
communities—they allow resolution of the disputes that arise when a property owner seeks to
intensify the use of her land. The bargaining over individualized exactions, she argues, is
consistent with the open norms necessary to successful mediation. It provides “an appropriate
solution” that may not offer “a single answer complying with fixed standards, but rather a mix of
accommodations.”279 Whether overseen by the local government, or by the judiciary,280 an ADR
professional,281 or an independent local official,282 a negotiation process may be especially
important and successful in local land use disputes where situated disputants have ongoing
relationships and where a limited universe of interested parties might enable all or a majority to
reach some form of consensus as to the terms of an agreement.283
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When the resolution to a land use conflict emerges from negotiation rather than from the
administrative imposition of a legislated, predetermined formula, a decision to allow
development can appear more legitimate. The collective process by which the result was
reached enables all sides ultimately to support, or at least not to block, the ultimate agreement to
allow development.284 The resolution may also be substantively better to the extent that the sides
are able to communicate information about the proposal as well as their concerns and interests to
each other, either directly or through a third party, and thus come to some understanding of their
respective needs and expectations.285 A negotiated resolution may also be more secure in the
future. When an unforeseen event or impact arises, a prior negotiated resolution among repeat
players in a land use game with long-term relationships—such as developers, local governments,
and political majorities—may better lend itself to inexpensive non-legal adjustments in a good
faith effort to preserve an ongoing consensus. By contrast, when new events or impacts call into
question decisions that had been judicially or administratively imposed, landowners are more
likely to consider the prior result as declaring a binding entitlement, and community-members
are more like to litigate than to negotiate as a result.286 Negotiated solutions are also generally
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less expensive and more amicable than litigation and administrative appeals over complicated
and contentious legal and factual issues.287
This argument about administrative formulas is consistent with similar claims about the
role of what Carol Rose has called the “muddy” and “crystal” rules in property law.288 For Rose,
muddy rules (or standards) characterize a recurring tendency within doctrinal cycles to shift
towards “fuzzy, ambiguous rules of decision” and away from clear, crystal rules (only, at other
times, to shift back again).289 A benefit of vague and open-ended mud rules, Rose argues, is
their mimicry of negotiations and communication within long-term, situated relationships and a
constituted community.290 And as such, according to Marc Poirier, the rhetorical and
jurisprudential power of muddy rules’ vagueness arises from how it “allows and forces citizens
to participate in societal discourse” and to consider the terms of any judicial, political, or
administrative resolution in a manner that is fair to all parties concerned.291 Crystal rules—
whether imposed by the judiciary (as in Nollan and Dolan) or by legislatures and administrators
(as in regulatory formulas for exactions)—may protect especially vulnerable individuals but are
opposed to, and may inhibit, individualized and collective decision-making.
Negotiated land use decisionmaking and dispute resolution do not work under certain
circumstances292 and may not in practice be as inclusive and participatory as they appear in
287
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theory.293 Certain communities at certain moments may lack the willingness, ability, and
information to negotiate fairly, inclusively, and in good faith. When this occurs, property owners
or the larger community may agree, or be forced to agree, to an unfair or unwise compromise.
Judicial review in such instances would impose a proper check on the resulting bargain and the
process by which it was reached. But to the extent that Nollan and Dolan and their
consequences heighten the risk of takings liability for negotiated solutions and shrink the
universe of potential negotiating points by limiting the scope and quantity of entitlements
governments can require and accept, they may frustrate efforts to utilize bargaining and
negotiation to mediate land use disputes within the specific context of the affected parties.294
Parallel to the wider political benefits of allowing greater political contest in land use
decisions,295 enabling more negotiated settlements to those disputes has wider benefits to the
social conception of property and property rights. By enabling a community-based resolution to
a political dispute over property rights, development, and impacts, exactions serve what Rose has
described as the “propriety” version of the western conception of private property296 and what
Laura Underkuffler has described as the historically significant “comprehensive” approach to
property in American law.297 Rather than mere preference satisfaction or utilitarian
consequentialism, the “proprietarian” version of property emphasizes responsibility and
293
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trusteeship both by the property owner and the community within which the owner is socially
located. Rose finds in modern takings law’s flexible, ad hoc balancing of private loss and public
benefit the echoes of this conception of property.298 And rather than an individualist conception
of the exercise and realization of property rights, Underkuffler’s comprehensive approach
conceptualizes property as including a “a broad range of human liberties understood within a
collective context of both support and restraint.”299 Formalist and formulaic approaches to the
law and to the administration of exactions frustrate this conception of property by substituting
logics and metrics for the open-ended negotiations of situated, affected parties.
Conclusion
If Justice Scalia’s suspicion that courts and local governments are knowingly and widely
disobeying the Court’s takings rules is valid; and if local governments, property owners, and/ or
third parties are dissatisfied with an increasingly formalized and formulaic development process;
and if the systematic under- and overregulation of land use has led in some areas to
environmental and infrastructural regulation and in other areas to underutilization of developable
land, then, this Article has argued, the culprit may be Nollan and Dolan’s takings formalism.
Protecting individual property owners from the vagaries of political majorities and regulatory
transitions is clearly an essential purpose of contemporary judicial review under the Takings
Clause. But the excessive leverage that Nollan and Dolan’s protective commands provide for all
property owners—which protect them even, in some instances, from bargains they would
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willingly make—not only demonstrates the commands’ overinclusivity, but also threatens the
political, social, environmental, and economic benefits that land use regulation and local
government offer. Takings rules seek to limit the unruly, particularistic, politicized sites of land
use law. As a general matter, judicial and administrative noncompliance and frustration with
essential nexus and rough proportionality requirements is not caused by the systematic resistance
of ideological courts and local governments. Rather, this noncompliance and frustration
demonstrates the complicated dynamics of locality operating in the shadows of takings
formalism.
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